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Abstract  
 
This study compares the China mainland cross listed firms with Hong Kong-domiciled firms 
and examines whether cross listed firms exhibit similar accounting quality as Hong 
Kong-domiciled firms. The empirical results indicate that cross listed firms have more earning 
smoothing, greater tendency to manage towards a target, less frequency of timely loss 
recognition and lower association with stock prices. It may suggest that the cross listed firms 
could not benefit from cross listing by committing themselves to subject to strong oversights 
and higher standards of external governance due to the lax enforcement of regulations and 
cross border jurisdiction issue. In addition, we also examine the difference of accounting 
quality on cross listed firms and Overseas Chinese firms, which documents significant higher 
accounting quality for Overseas Chinese firms than cross listed firms. These findings are 
consistent with previous empirical results on cross listed firms versus Hong Kong firms. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background: The Harmonisation of Accounting Standards  
With the globalisation of businesses and investments, it has been recognised that there is a 
need for moving toward harmonisation of accounting standards across the globe. Many 
efforts have been made by international institutions, such as International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and EU, to promote the harmonization of different accounting 
standards among a number of countries since the 1970s.  
 
In 2001 the international accounting standards committee (IASC) has been reconstructed to 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and started to issue International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) which aims to ³develop a single set of high quality, 
understandable, enforceable and globally accepted international financial reporting standards 
(IFRSs)´ (IASB, 2009a).  
 
The harmonization of accounting standards has made significant achievement so far. Since 
2005, the IFRSs are mandatory for the consolidated accounts of all listed companies in the 
European Union (EU), which marked a large shift from numerous local GAAPs (Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practices) to a single set of principle based accounting standards in the 
EU zone. According to IASB (2009b), there are more than 100 countries that have adopted, 
allowed or converged to IFRSs. In 2002, The US Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) started to advocate convergence negotiation with IASB. In 2007, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission has permitted Non-US companies to report with IFRS without 
reconciliation to US GAAP since 30 April 2007 (SEC, 2007). SEC also announced a roadmap 
to converge to IFRSs and plans to require the use of IFRS by all US-domiciled Companies by 
2014. 
 
China, as an emerging market economy, has been long aware of the importance of a set of 
accounting standards with international comparability since it wants to take part in global 
economy and benefit from foreign businesses and investments. Since 1992, China has 
issued four sets of accounting regulations in year of 1992, 1998, 2001, and 2006 respectively; 
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each replaced the previous one and was considered to be in greater conformity with IFRS 
(Chen et al., 2002; Pacter and Yuen, 2001). In 2006, China promulgated and published a new 
set of Chinese Financial Reporting Standards (CHFRSs), which is substantially convergent to 
the internationally IFRSs. Nevertheless, it seems that there are still significant differences 
between Chinese version of IFRS and published IFRSs because of the characteristics of 
China as an emerging market. For example, the Chinese IFRSs still adhere to historical 
costing of investment properties rather than marking to market for all real estate companies 
(Deloitte, 2006). On the other hand, Hong Kong has initiated and adopted new accounting 
standards convergent to IFRSs since 2005, namely Hong Kong Financial Reporting 
Standards (HKFRSs) and these HKFRSs became effective in 1st January, 2005 and all listed 
companies in Hong Kong stock market are mandatory to adopt the new accounting standards 
since then. While Hong Kong stock market has originated and strongly been influenced by 
UK accounting standards and practice since 1970s (HKCPA, 2009). Therefore, Hong Kong 
market is regarded as developed market by ICP (Claessens.et al, 2000) and hence is 
assumed to have better accounting quality than China Mainland market. Therefore, many 
China mainland firms are assumed to benefit from legal bonding by committing themselves to 
rigorous regulations and oversights in a stronger legal environment in Hong Kong when they 
list on Hong Kong or other overseas stock markets in seek of accessing to overseas capital 
and investors. 
 
However, literature suggests that application of accounting standards depends on 
country-specific factors, like regulatory enforcement, legal environment and managerial 
incentives. Eccher and Healy (2003) against others argue that China lacks the financial 
infrastructure and effective enforcement of IASs, which will impede Chinese investors 
benefiting from better relevance and reliability resulting from new IASs. Further, as Siegel 
¶VLQGLFDWHGWKDWLQKLVVWXG\RI0H[LFDQILUPVFURVVOLVWRQ86PDUNHWVWKHUHDUHOLPLWHG
evidence of improvement of these cross listed firms since the different underlying manager 
incentives and regulatory environments may result in different accounting quality. Although it 
VHHPV WKDW FURVV OLVWLQJPD\HQWDLO VRPH µµUHSXWDWLRQDO ERQGLQJ¶¶ WKURXJKYROXQWDU\DFWLRQV
undertaken by typical cross-OLVWLQJILUPVWKHH[WHQWRIDFWXDOµµOHJDOERQGLQJ¶¶E\FURVV-listed 
firms may be more limited than often assumed. 
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1.2. Dissertation aims 
 
Therefore, the aim of my dissertation is to resolve the question that is there significantly 
different characteristics of accounting data from cross-listed firms compared to Hong 
Kong-domiciled firms, due to the extent that cross-listed face different context of China 
Mainland rather than Hong Kong.  More specifically, I will examine the effects on accounting 
quality from four dimensions: earnings smoothing, small positive earnings target, timely loss 
recognition and value relevancy. The accounting quality is improved if the adoption of IFRS in 
China leads to less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and higher value 
relevance than when applied the old standards 
1.3. Dissertation Structure 
My dissertation mainly consists of four sections:  
Section I - Literature Reviews 
This section will examine the issues surrounding quality improvement of financial statements 
through IFRSs adoption and cross listing. Firstly, the effects of IFRSs adoption on accounting 
quality improvement will be examined and a further discussion on possible reasons for 
ineffectiveness of IFRSs adoption. Second part of this section mainly focuses whether cross 
listing could increase the quality of financial accounts in terms of subjecting to other equity 
PDUNHWV¶RYHUVLJKWVDQGUHJXODWLRQV,WHQGVLQWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQVRIWKHQHHGIRUHPSLULFDOVWXG\
and the formulation of the research hypothesis. 
Section II - Research Design 
This section justifies the specific methodology employed in the empirical study, standardizes 
the regressions to capture the effects of cross listing of Chinese firms on Hong Kong equity 
market with interpretation of key variables. In addition, it verifies the means of collecting 
empirical data and describes the sample characteristics. 
 
Section III ± Findings and Discussions 
 
This section examines my hypothesis, compares and contrasts the empirical results of cross 
listed sample relative to Hong Kong domiciled group and Overseas Chinese group. Based on 
the empirical results, it draws some findings with the previous researches and findings.  
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Section VI ± Conclusions 
 
This section revisits the research objectives, summarizes the findings of this empirical study 
and presents conclusions based on findings. Also, it discusses recommendations for further 
research and relevant regulatory bodies. 
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CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of relevant literature will firstly focus on the quality of IFRSs in improving financial 
reporting as well as the effects of IFRSs adoption on accounting quality. The second part of 
literature reviews focus relation between cross listing and accounting quality and discuss 
whether cross listing could facilitate the quality of financial reporting by committing to higher 
legal environment and stronger oversights. Lastly, hypothesis of my dissertation will be 
developed following the prior research.  
 
2.1. IFRSs1 And Accounting Quality  
One of objectives of promoting IFRSs by IASB is to develop an internationally acceptable set 
of high quality financial reporting standards. In order to achieve this objective, actions have 
been taken by IASC and IASB to remove allowable accounting alternatives by issuing new 
principles-based standards so as to ensure that the accounting measurements can better 
UHIOHFW D ILUP¶V HFRQRPLF SRVLWLRQ DQG SHUIRUPDQFH UDWKHU WKDQ OHJDO IRUP ,$6& 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) further argue that the IFRS could limit managerial manipulation 
on accounting amounts by limiting accounting measurements alternatives and hence the 
accounting information can be of higher quality. However, IFRSs, as a set of principle based 
standards, also allows managers to utilize their discretions in reporting accounting numbers, 
partiFXODUO\ LQ IDLU YDOXH DFFRXQWLQJ ,W LV EHFDXVH GRLQJ VR FRXOG EHWWHU UHIOHFW D ILUP¶V
underlying economics and hence provides investors with more reliable and timely information 
to aid them in making investment decisions. Therefore, it does not matter the accounting 
amounts are determined by either principles-based standards or required accounting 
measurements as long as it provides high quality of accounting information to investors. 
 
Basically, accounting quality refers to the quality of financial statements. High quality financial 
DFFRXQWV FRXOG DFFXUDWHO\ UHIOHFW WKH ILUPV¶ XQGHUO\LQJ HFRQRPLF UHDOLW\ WKHUHIRUH SURYLGH
                                          
1To simplify the presentation, we use the term IFRS to refer to both International Financial Reporting 
Standards issued by the IASB and IAS issued by the IASB¶s predecessor, the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC). 
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useful information to investors and aid them to make more informed investment decisions. 
According to Ball (2006), financial statements are considered as high accounting quality has 
to meet the following requirements: 
1. )LQDQFLDO DFFRXQWV DFFXUDWHO\ GHSLFWV D ILUP¶V HFRQRPLF UHDOLW\ DQG SHUIRUPDQFH
rather than legal form; 
2. There is low capacity for managerial manipulation in determining accounting 
numbers; 
3. Financial information is recorded in a timely way, e.g. large losses are recognised 
promptly; 
4. Accounting information is revealed in terms of Asymmetric timeliness, for instance, 
bad news is revealed in terms of equity market prices more promptly than good news. 
 
6LQFH,)56VSURPLVHWRSURYLGHKLJKTXDOLW\RIDFFRXQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQG³RIIHU LQFUHDVHG
FRPSDUDELOLW\DQGKHQFH UHGXFHG LQIRUPDWLRQFRVWVDQG LQIRUPDWLRQ ULVN WR LQYHVWRUV´ %DOO
2006), it is regarded that firms or countries could considerably benefit from adopting a single 
set of internationally recognised IFRSs. Ball (2006) summarised a number of advantages of 
adopting IFRSs. First, IFRSs could ensure more accurate, comprehensive and timely 
accounting information relative to national GAAPs in most countries, including Continental 
Europe, which could improve the ability of investors to make more informed financial 
decisions and lead to a reduced risk to investors. Second, the single set of IFRSs eliminate the 
differences in accounting standards as well as the confusion arising from different measures 
of financial position and performance across countries. The increased comparability could not 
only reduce the cost of investors investing international and boost the international capital 
liquidity, but also facilitate the cross-border merger and acquisitions. Thirdly, the higher quality 
RIDFFRXQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQFRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHHIILFLHQF\RIHTXLW\PDUNHWVDQGUHIOHFWWKHILUP¶V
value more accurately and timely in terms of stock prices. Further, Ball (2006) indicated that 
other indirect advantages from IFRSs adoption could be more beneficial to the investors and 
companies in the long term. One of the indirect advantages arises from that the higher quality 
of accounting information could reduce the agency cost between shareholders and managers. 
Since the timeliness of information and increased transparency cause the managers to make 
investment decisions more in the interests of shareholders rather than expanding the firms by 
undertaking unprofitable investment projects (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). The increased 
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transparency, particularly the timelier loss recognition, also enhances the oversight from debt 
markets since debt covenants violations will be quicker when firms encounter large losses 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  
 
While regarding the effects of IFRSs on accounting quality, a number of prior researches 
provide positive evidence that IFRSs adoption could increase the accounting quality of 
financial statements using different accounting quality measuring approaches. Four 
measures of accounting quality are widely used assess the accounting quality effects of IFRS 
adoption, i.e., earnings smoothing, small positive earnings targeting, timely loss recognition 
and value relevance (e.g., Lang et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al. 
2008; Christensen et al. 2008; Paananen 2008; Dechow et al. 1995, 2003; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; McNichols 2002; Francis et al. 2005). For example, Barth et al (2008) 
examined whether the application of International accounting standards (IASs) in 21 
countries lead to higher accounting quality and the evidence showed less earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting amounts 
than firms adopt domestic GAAPs.  
 
 
Using similar accounting quality measures, Morais and Curto (2008) compared the earnings 
quality and value relevance of accounting data of 34 Portuguese listed firms pre and post 
adoption of IFRSs. Consistent with Chen et al (2008), the Portuguese firms, after they adopt 
IASB standards, report less earnings smoothing and more value relevant than those firms 
when adopting national GAAPs. They further argued that the lower accounting quality when 
abiding Portuguese GAAPs may be attributed to the fact that one of major stakeholders, 
EDQNVKDYHVWURQJ LQIOXHQFHRQILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDO UHSRUWLQJDnd able to get inside information 
rather accessing it form the public. With a finer and more specific model on value relevance, 
Horton and Serafeim (2006) investigated whether there is any market reaction to and value 
relevance of reconciliation adjustments from UK companies in the transition to IFRS 
compliance and found that reconciliation adjustments exhibited more accounting quality in 
terms of value relevance since these adjustments showed higher association with stock 
prices than the accounting numbers under UK GAAPs. They further explained that the 
incremental value relevance to IFRS can be attributed to adjustments caused by impairment 
of goodwill and deferred taxes. Moreover, Bartov et al. (2005) studied the value relevance of 
earnings on German listed companies which all reported under Germany GAAP, US GAAP 
and IFRS in the period from 1998 to 2000. They found that US GAAP and IFRS are more 
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value relevant than German GAAP because US GAAPs and IFRSs are both based on 
investors model while German GAAPs rely on stakeholder model. Therefore, financial 
statements under investor model provide more information to investors and hence are more 
associated with stock markets. In addition, Daske, H. and Gebhardt, G. (2006) adopted a 
different approach of measuring accounting quality by assessing disclosure quality scores 
extracted from detailed analyses of the financial statements of Austrian, German and Swiss 
firms and found the disclosure quality of the financial statements of European firms has 
increased significantly under IFRS and the results hold for both voluntary and mandatory 
financial disclosure, which complements the evidence from Barth et al(2008) etc. and 
suggests that the quality of financial reports has increased with the adoption of IFRSs.  
 
 
However, Harris and Muller (1999) documented mixed evidence from their study on a sample 
of 82 Non-US firms which subject to IFRS and reconcile with US-GAAP between 1992 and 
1996. In terms of market valuation of earnings and book value, the result showed that 
Reconciliations are value-relevant; IFRS are more closely associated with price-per-share 
than US GAAP, but less correlated with returns than US GAAP. Further, there are studies 
showing opposite evidence that the adoption of IFRS has no effect or even negative effect on 
the quality of accounting information. Paananen (2008) stated financial reporting quality was 
decreased in the period from 2003 to 2006 after Sweden adopted IFRS. However, he further 
indicated that this negative evidence is more likely to be attributed to the change of 
accounting standards rather than the adoption of IFRSs. Niskanen et al. (1998) investigated 
the value relevance of Finnish accounting standards (FAS) and the voluntary reconciliations 
to the IAS. He found that Finnish accounting standards are significantly value relevant to 
earnings numbers and the reconciliations to IAS seem not to be value relevant. In case of 
China, Eccher and Healy (2003) compared accounting amounts based on lAS and Chinese 
standards and indicated that the lAS is no more of use than the local Chinese GAAP. 
Earnings under PRC GAAP exhibited more value relevance with annual stock market returns, 
more tendencies of managing earnings than under IAS. Eccher and Healy (2003) pointed out 
that the reason why IAS fails to provide more useful information is attributed to the lack of 
financial infrastructure and effective controls on applying the IAS properly. 
 
Although IFRSs are generally accepted as a set of higher quality accounting standards than 
most domestic accounting standards (e.g. Leuz 2003; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 
2007, 2008), concerns have been raised that whether firms and countries could benefit from 
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the adoption of IFRSs in terms of accounting quality improvement. Many researchers have 
investigated the ineffectiveness of IFRSs in different countries. As Ball et al. (2003) have 
argued that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality 
information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. There are many other factors could affect the 
adoption of IFRSs, thereby the benefits of adopting IFRSs. First, the different level of 
enforcement of financial reporting system might impede the improvement in accounting 
quality from the application of the higher quality accounting standards. Daske et al. (2008) 
agreed with this point and indicated that strong legal enforcement is indispensable in order to 
gain the market benefits of IFRS adoption. On the other hand, Ball et al (2003), studied Four 
Asian countries of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and suggested that lax 
enforcement can significantly limit the compliance with the accounting standards as well as 
their effectiveness. From another angle, the IFRSs are based on the legal environments and 
consistent with western accounting value in developed countries. As a result, it is difficult for 
emerging market countries, which lack financial infrastructure and rigorous legal environment, 
to adopt and benefit from the higher quality accounting standards which is rooted in sound 
regulatory environment of Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
Another explanation is the regulatory environment in which the firms operate has an important 
impact on the application of accounting standards (Bradshaw and Miller, 2005). Burgstahler et 
al. (2006) indentified that less earnings management is confined with strong legal systems. 
Leuz, et al. (2003) also found out that earnings smoothing is less pronounced in common law 
countries because lAS are principle based standards which are consistent with the conceptual 
framework of common law countries.  
 
Third, managerial incentive is an important factor in determining to what extent the firm applies 
the accounting standards, therefore the accounting quality. Christensen et al. (2008) 
suggested that DFFRXQWLQJTXDOLW\LPSURYHPHQWVDUHVWURQJO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKILUPV¶LQFHQWLYHV
to adopt. They further explained that firms have closer connections with banks and inside 
shareholders tend to resist IFRSs. Without rigorous application of IFRSs, it is unlikely to 
SURPRWH WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG UHOLDELOLW\ RI ILUPV¶ DFFRXQWLQJ DPRXQWV DQG HOLPLQDWH DQ\
benefits of IFRSs. In the other hand, Daske et al. (2008) found negative evidence on 
accounting quality with relation to mandatory IFRS adoption. For firms voluntary to be 
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transparent and countries with strong legal enforcement, their market liquidity and equity 
valuations are increased and cost of capital is decreased.  
 
Regarding the adoption of IFRSs, both countries and firms are conservative about it and prefer 
to adopt it gradually, producing their own version of IFRSs combined with local GAAPs. This 
could in part explain why there are mixed evidence on accounting quality improvement in 
terms of IFRSs. Although the development of high quality accounting standards is time 
consuming and costly, Levitt (1997) argued that it is worth it because high quality accountings 
standards result in greater investor confidence reduce capital costs and make fair market 
prices possible. 
 
2.2. Cross Listing On Accounting Quality 
Cross listing refers to that a firm lists its equity shares on one or more foreign stock 
exchange in addition to its domestic exchange. It becomes more feasible for firms to cross list 
and raise FDSLWDO RQ RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ HTXLW\ PDUNHW VLQFH JOREDOL]DWLRQ KDV ORZHUHG WKH
barriers to foreign trade and investments and facilitated the free cross-border capital flows 
while technology has instantaneous flows of information (Coffee, 2002). Further, 
Roosenboom and Dijk (2009) indentified a number of motivations to cross listing abroad. For 
example, cross listing could lower the cost of capital that arises because shares can be 
accessed by global investors and the market liquidity is increased. Also, It is argued that the 
cross listing could increase the information disclosure and provide better investor protection 
E\³ERQGLQJ´WRVWURQJHQIRUFHPHQWV\VWHPVDQGKLJKHUVWDQGDUGVRIFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH
(Coffee, 1999, 2002), therefore lower the cost of capital and attract investors other reluctant 
to invest. 
 
$FFRUGLQJ WR&RIIHH¶VERQGLQJ WKHRU\FURVV OLVWLQJFRXOG LPSURYHWKHDFFRXQWLQJTXDOLW\RI
cross listed companies because the bonding to higher enforcement system and oversights 
ensure cross listed firms to provide the fuller and timelier information disclosure and therefore 
SUHYHQW PDQDJHUV¶ RSSRUWXQLVWLF GLVFUHWLRQ IURP expropriating the minority shareholders 
(Coffee, 1999, 2002). Ribstein (2007) agree with &RIIHH¶VERQGLQJK\SRWKHVLV, indicating that 
FURVVOLVWHGILUPVFDQ³UHQW´WKHVHFXULWLHVODZVLQRWKHUFRXQWULHVE\OLVWLQJVHFXULWLHVRQWKHLU
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countries while remaining subject to local laws. It could, if the bonding effects are significant, 
complement the weak regulatory enforcement and low investor protection environment in 
which cross listed firms are.  
 
Because of the sound legal and enforcement systems and high quality of US GAAPs, the 
bonding mechanism could improve the quality of cross listed non-86FRPSDQLHV¶DFFRXQWLQJ
information through two ways. First, cross-listing on a United States stock markets essentially 
enforces the cross listed firms to abide US laws and regulations, and hence disclosures more 
information and protects investors, especially minority shareholders effectively. More 
specifically, the cross listed firms not only are required to reconcile its financial reporting to 
U.S.GAAP accounting standards and provided more detailed disclosure, but also commit 
WKHPVHOYHVWREHVXEMHFWWR6(&¶VRYHUVLJKW&RIIHH,QDGGLWLRQ, the rights of minority 
investors can be exercised easily and effectively on any doubtable management action and 
fraudulent statements made anywhere in the world (Coffee, 2002; Reese and Weisbach, 
2002). Stulz (1999) also indicates that the legal regime in U.S. is effective in enforcing cross 
OLVWLQJILUPVDQGSURWHFWLQJPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWV  
  
Besides the legal bonding mentioned above, reputational bonding is another approach for 
cross listing firms to subject to scrutiny from all kinds of professionals, including underwriters, 
auditors and securities analysts etc. Under this circumstance, cross listed firms tend to 
voluntarily make fair and full disclosure and thereby build their reputations on financial 
reporting (Coffee, 2002). Furthermore, Lang et al., (2003) showed that cross listed firms have 
greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy compared to non cross listed firms 
and they concluded that cross listing could lead to better information environment for cross 
listed firms and consequently higher market valuations. 
 
6RPH UHVHDUFKHUV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK &RIIHH¶V ERQGLQJ K\SRWKHVLV KDYH UHFRJQLVHG WKH
importance of legal bonding resulted from cross listing. For example, Doidge et al (2004) 
indicate that listing on U.S. markets limits the managerial opportunisms of controlling 
shareholders and prevents them from expropriating minority investors. Therefore, cross listed 
firms show more valuable since they are more likely to take advantage of growth 
opportunities, particularly those from countries with low level of investor protection in the 
17 
 
ILUP¶V FRXQWU\ 0LWWRQ  LQ KLV VWXG\ RQ $VLDQ FURVV OLVWHG ILUPV GXULQJ $VLDQ FULVLV
indicates that firms cross list had more market value than the firms do not cross list when 
economy turned down at the beginning of Asian crisis. And he suggests that cross listing can 
act as a bonding instrument in economic downturn and/or emerging market crisis. Further, 
Doidge (2004) investigated the voting premiums related to cross listing on U.S. market and 
found evidence that the legal enforcement provided from U.S. markets increased the 
protection level to minority investors and effectively prevented the management or major 
shareholders from seeking private benefits. Reese and Weisbach (2002) pointed out that 
cross listed firms from countries with weak shareholder protection tend to seek investor 
protection improvement by voluntarily bonding themselves to US securities and market 
regulations as well as raising more capital more in and outside the US. In addition, 
Roosenboom and Dijk (2009) provided evidence that cross listing on London exchange 
market is associated with improved disclosure and bonding creating value for cross-listings in 
terms of higher announcement return.  
 
However, other authors tend to disagree that cross listing firms can actually bond themselves 
to U.S. markets regulations and oversights effectively. Substantial noncompliance with U.S. 
GAAP is implied by Frost and Pownall (1994) in annual and interim reports of cross listed 
firms. MacNeil (2001) finds real bonding effects of foreign cross listing firms on London 
market is weaker than has previously been assumed. La Porta et al (2000) argue that 
minority shareholders do have effective rights on cross-listing firms in New York, although it 
might lead to fuller disclosure. Fanto (1996) further claimed that firms can deal with SEC 
disclosure requirements easily by some paperwork and these requirements are not effective 
in practice. Moreover, consistent with FanWR¶V ILQGLQJV VLQFH WKH HQIRUFHPHQW RI 86
regulations on non-U.S. firms is quite poor, managers could opportunistically seek for private 
benefits of their control on firms (Licht, 2000, 2003). Furthermore, Licht (2003) indicates that 
the reason of cross listing is not likely to pursue better investor protection and corporate 
governance by firms themselves and managers always tend to seek private benefits of 
control rather than really bonding to oversights and regulations with better governance. 
 
Although the reputational bonding seems to facilitate cross listing firms to provide more 
voluntary disclosure, the legal bonding actually does have much influence on cross listing 
firms. As Siegel (2005) stated that the SEC failed to enforce U.S. regulation and laws on 
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Non-U.S. firms cross list and institutional and jurisdiction obstacles also impede the exercise 
RI PLQRULW\ LQYHVWRUV¶ ULJKWV DJDLQVW FURVV OLVWLQJ ILUPV¶ IUDXGXOHQW Dctions. Siegel (2005) 
concludes: 
 
³7KHOHVVRQWREHGUDZQIURPWKLVDQDO\VLVLVthat the rules of the game are different 
in practice than as formally established. Some rules simply cannot be strictly 
enforced across borders, while the enforcement of other rules could require large 
resource investments. To understand institutions, one has to carefully analyze both 
the formal rules and their informal application. Often the informal application of legal 
institutions is not what would be predicted by an isolated analysis of formal 
institutions. Even in the U.S., which the literature ranks as having some of the 
strongest and most complete legal institutions in the world, institutions do not always 
ZRUNLQSUDFWLFHDVWKH\DUHRVWHQVLEO\GHVLJQHGWRIXQFWLRQ´ 
 
 
Some studies on accounting quality of cross listed firms provide consistent findings with 
6HLJHO¶V VWDWHPHQW DQG VWDWH WKDW WKHUH DUH OLPLWHG HYLGHQFH RQ DFFRXQWLQJ TXDOLW\
improvement by bonding the firms cross list to U.S. security market and regulations. For 
H[DPSOH/DQJHWDOFRPSDUH86ILUPV¶HDUQLQJVZLWKUHFRQFLOHGHDUQLngs for non-US 
firms cross list. Non-86 ILUPV¶ HDUQLQJV VWLOO H[KLELWHG KLJKHU HDUQLQJ VPRRWKLQJ PRUH
frequency of managing toward small positive earnings targets, less timely recognition and 
lower value relevance due to different characteristics of Non-U.S. firms attributed to different 
local contexts, although both US and non-US companies are under the SEC oversights and 
same regulations nominally. Further, Bradshaw & Miller (2004) pointed out the importance of 
regulatory oversights and enforcement to reach real convergence of US GAAP for non-U.S. 
firms, although the cross OLVWHGILUPV¶DFFRXQWLQJQXPEHUV is generally compliance with US 
GAAP.  
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2.3. Hypothesis Development 
Drawing from prior research, four measures of accounting quality are widely used, which 
includes earnings smoothing, small positive earnings targets, timely loss recognition, and 
value relevance of earnings. In addition, higher quality of accounting amounts are defined as 
lower level of earnings smoothing, lower tendency of small positive earnings target, more 
timely loss recognition, and higher value relevance of earnings and equity book value.  
 
2.3.1. Earning smoothing hypothesis 
It is assumed that firms with more earnings variability suggest less earnings smoothing Based 
on prior research (Lang et al, 2003). Although Watts and Zimmerman (1986) mentioned that 
the exercise of management discretion can cause either opportunistic manipulation that 
possibly misleads WKH ILUP¶V economic performance or disclosure of private information of 
ILUPV WKDW LV PRUH UHIOHFWLYH RI ILUP¶V XQGHUO\LQJ SHUIRUPDQFH PDQ\ VWXGLHV FODLPHG WKDW
OLPLWDWLRQVRQGLVFUHWLRQKDYHDJUHDWHUHIIHFWRQRSSRUWXQLVWLFGLVFUHWLRQWKDQRQPDQDJHUV¶
ability to reveal private information about the firm (Barth et al, 2008). For example, Barth et al 
(2008) show that applying IAS which is of higher quality than domestic standards should result 
in higher earnings variability. Leuz et al (2003) find there is less earnings smoothing in 
common law countries since lAS is principle based and similar to those of common law.  
 
5HJDUGLQJWRHDUQLQJVVPRRWKLQJ,H[SHFW+.ILUPV¶RYHUVHDV&KLQHVHILUPVHDUQLQJVWREH
less of smoothing than cross listing firms because the Hong Kong domiciled legal and 
regulatory environment enables strict oversights on firms reporting choices and strong 
investor protection, therefore earnings of HK firms are more reflective of their economic 
performance. Due to the lack of legal and regulatory environment and regulatory enforcement, 
the managers are likely more motivated to manage the earnings, therefore leading to smaller 
variability in accounting earnings. Prior researchers, like Lang et al (2006), studied the cross 
listed firms from countries with different legal and regulatory environment and economic 
condition and indicated that a more earning variability suggests a higher level of earning 
smoothing. Similarly, another metric of earnings smoothing I assume is negative correlation 
between accruals and cash flows (Lang et al, 2006). Because managers tend to respond to 
poor cash flow outcomes by increasing accruals, a more negative correlation between 
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accruals and cash flows exhibit more of earnings smoothing. I formulate hypotheses from 1 to 
3 in null forms as follow: 
H1: There is no difference in the variance of change in net income between the cross listed 
firms and Hong Kong domiciled (Overseas Chinese) firms list on the same Hong Kong equity 
market 
 
H2: There is no difference in ratio of the variances in the change in net income and change in 
cash flows between the cross listed firms and Hong Kong domiciled (Overseas Chinese) 
firms list on the same Hong Kong equity market 
 
H3: There is no difference in the correlation of accruals and cash flows between the cross 
listed firms and Hong Kong domiciled (Overseas Chinese) firms list on the same Hong Kong 
equity market 
I test hypotheses 1 to 3 against the alternative that cross listed firms have more earnings 
smoothing. Therefore, I predict that cross listed firms have lower quality than Hong Kong 
(Overseas Chinese) firms  
 
2.3.2. Managing towards small positive earnings 
Managing towards small positive earnings is the second measure the prior studies have 
suggested and the metric to examine the fact of managing towards positive earnings is to 
measure the frequency of small positive net income scaled by total assets (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Leuz et al, 2003). It is regarded that management prefers to report small 
positive net income rather than negative net income. (Barth et al, 2008). Thus, I predict that 
mainland China cross listed firms tend to report small positive net income more frequently 
than HK firms. The hypothesis 4 is formulated as below:  
H4: There is no difference in the frequency of small positive net income between the cross 
listed firms and Hong Kong domiciled (Overseas Chinese) firms list on the same Hong Kong 
equity market 
I test hypothesis 4 against the alternative that cross listed firms exhibit more small positive 
earnings. Therefore, I predict that cross listed firms have lower quality than Hong Kong 
(Overseas Chinese) firms. 
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2.3.3. timely loss recognition 
Thirdly, the timely loss recognition with higher frequencies suggests higher quality earnings, 
according to (Lang et al, 2006),  further indicated the relation between earning smoothing 
and timely loss recognition is that if earnings are managed and smoothed, large losses should 
be relatively rare. Managers prefer not to recognize large losses and defer the large losses to 
future periods. I predict that firms cross list report large losses with higher frequency than 
those HK firms. However, it is possible that higher quality accounting could result in a lower 
frequency of timely large losses. In the case of big bath, management will exercise its 
discretion which leads to a higher frequency of large losses.  
H5: There is no difference in the frequency of large losses between the cross listed firms and 
Hong Kong domiciled (Overseas Chinese) firms list on the same Hong Kong equity market 
I test hypothesis 5 against the alternative that cross listed firms have more incentives to avoid 
large losses recognition. Therefore, I predict that cross listed firms have lower quality in terms 
of timely loss recognition than Hong Kong (Overseas Chinese) firms. 
 
 
2.3.4. Value relevance 
 
Finally, it suggests that higher quality earnings are more value relevant with stock market 
(Lang et al, 2006). According to Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), they concluded that higher 
quality accounting standards that limit opportunistic discretion could result in higher value 
relevance of accounting earnings. A number of prior research show that decision usefulness 
is captured by value relevance of reported accounting numbers (Ndubizu and Hong, 2007; 
Ndubizu and Sanchez, 2006; and Brown et al., 1999) Consistent with prior empirical research, 
I expect that firms with higher quality accounting have a higher association between stock 
prices and earnings. Accordingly, I predict that firms cross-listed on HK market exhibit higher 
value relevance of earnings than firms domiciled in Hong Kong. However, the adoption of 
value relevance is based on certain assumptions. First, it assumes the stock market is 
adequDWHO\HIILFLHQW DQGSULFHV WKH ILUPV¶VWRFN LQD VLPLODUZD\DFURVV ILUPVDQG LQGXVWU\
after I control the firm size, country, and industry. Eccher and Healy (2003), however, argued 
WKDWSULFHVUHIOHFWLQYHVWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHDQGLVOLNHO\WRGLIIHUDFURVVfirms. 
H6: There is no difference in the value relevance of reported accounting numbers between the 
cross listed firms and Hong Kong domiciled (Overseas Chinese) firms list on the same Hong 
Kong equity market 
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I test hypothesis 6 against the alternative that cross listed shows less value relevant to stock 
market. Therefore, I predict that cross listed firms have lower quality than Hong Kong 
(Overseas Chinese) firms. 
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CHAPTER THREE CHINA MAINLAND AND HONG KONG CONTEXTS 
In this chapter, I will introduce the China mainland and Hong Kong contexts in two aspects i.e. 
accounting standards development and equity markets in China and Hong Kong respectively. 
In section one, the history of accounting standards in China and Hong Kong will be given and 
a following discussion on the issues like the enforcement of accounting standards and the 
difference between China and Hong Kong. Similarly, in the following section, I will review the 
development of the equity markets in China and Hong Kong first and mainly examine the 
cooperation between China and Hong Kong stock markets in terms of cross listing.  
 
3.1. Development of accounting standards in China versus Hong Kong 
China started to reform the accounting system, along with its economic reform from central 
planning economy to a market-oriented economy in 1978. Before 1978, accounting and 
financial reporting in China was mainly designed to serve the centrally controlled economy, 
which is inherited from the former Soviet Union (Tang et al, 1996). At that time, Chinese 
accounting standards are quite rigid rule-based and prescriptive.  
 
From 1979 onwards, the internationalization of Chinese accounting system are driven by its 
economic reform as well as increasing international exchange activities. The Ministry of 
Finance announced a policy that Chinese accounting standards would conform to 
international accounting practice in 1989 (Chen, 1989). Within 3 years, China abandoned its 
old accounting system and promulgated its new accounting standards in 1992, which is 
WHUPHG DV %DVLF $FFRXQWLQJ 6WDQGDUGV ZKLFK LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK ,$6&¶V )UDPHZRrk and 
)$6%¶VFRQFHSWXDO)UDPHZRUN7DQJOn February 15, 2006, the Ministry of Finance 
RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD WKH 02) IRUPDOO\ DQQRXQFHG WKH LVVXLQJ RI WKH
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE), and required all Chinese listed 
companies to use it from January 1st, 2007. Except for certain modifications, the new 
standards are considered substantially in line with IFRS (Deloitte, 2006).  
 
+RZHYHUJRYHUQPHQWV¶LQYROYHPHQWlevies a significant impact on &KLQD¶VDFFRXQWLQJV\stem. 
According to Tang (2000), new accounting system promulgated in 1992 serves users of 
financial reports, including governments and management, besides of investors and creditors, 
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whereas focus on investors are superior to government and management in western 
accounting system. As a result, it is sometimes difficult to serve both outside investors and 
governments, because there might be conflict between investors and governments. For 
example, when the management team are government controlled, they might pursue 
PDQDJHPHQW¶V LQWHUHVWVDW WKHH[SHQVHRIRXWVLGH LQYHVWRUVDFFRUGLQJ WRDJHQF\ LVVXH ,Q
addition, there is still a very high degree of governmental control over accounting matters 
(Winkle et al, 1994). On the one hand, accounting professionalism is not independent and the 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountant (CICPA) are subject to direct supervision of 
Minister of Finance (Tang, 2000). On the other hand, the presence of government ownership 
in listed and non-listed companies is still substantial. Therefore, it is not easy for the CICPA to 
PDNH LQGHSHQGHQW GHFLVLRQV UHJDUGOHVV RI JRYHUQPHQWV¶ LQWHUHVWV 7KH GLVFORVXUH RI
state-RZQHGHQWHUSULVHV¶ILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQLVOLPLWHGDQGXVHOHVV  
 
While Hong Kong Institute of CPAs evolved from the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, 
which was established on 1 January 1973 (HKCPA, 2010). The HKCPA is granted by laws to 
promulgate accounting standards, auditing and ethical standards in Hong Kong and works in 
the public interest (HKCPA, 2010). With the assistance of ACCA, Hong Kong accounting 
standards are consistent with UK common law system and have been profoundly influenced 
by UK accounting practices. In 2005, HKCPA issued new accounting standards, namely 
Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (HKFRSs). Because of the close relation with UK, 
Hong Kong requires all listed companies in Hong Kong stock market mandatory to adopt the 
new accounting standards since1st January, 2005, which is same as he EU zone. 
 
 
3.2. Development of stock market in China versus Hong Kong 
 
The history of Hong Kong stock market can be traced back to 19 century when the 
Association of Stockbrokers in Hong Kong was established and it was renamed the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in 1914. Hong Kong equity market is classified by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) as a developed market (Claessens et al, 2000). On the other hand, 
in China, there are two major stock exchanges which are namely the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Shanghai stock market and 
Shenzhen stock market are opened on 26 December 1990 and 11 April 1991 respectively 
Both SHSE and SZSE offer A shares and B shares issued by Chinese domiciled companies 
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listed on these two markets. A share and B share are backed with same underlying company 
and carry the same shareholder rights and dividend payments. However, A-shares until late 
2002 were restricted to domestic investors, which represent the majority of market shares 
issued. On the other hand, B-shares are issued in foreign currencies were solely available to 
foreign investors until February 2001.  
 
 
The interactions between Hong Kong stock markets and mainland started in 1992, Chinese 
government made a decision to encourage its leading state-owned enterprises to list 
overseas and access to investor capital. Hong Kong market is the premier choice for Chinese 
companies which seek to list on, due to its sound financial environment and geography 
location. Regarding the Chinese companies listing on Hong Kong market, there are mainly 
two types of shares, which are H share and red chips. Accordingly, there is Hang Seng China 
Enterprise Index for H-shares and Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations Index for red 
chips. As required by SEHK (1997), the China-back companies listed in Hong Kong market 
have to follow the same set of regulations as other HK-domiciled companies and comply with 
the same set of disclosure requirements. As of December, 2005, there are 120 H shares and 
92 red chips are listed on Hong Kong stock market (CSRC, 2008). 
 
 
Comparing the H shares and red chips, H-shares are defined as companies actually 
incorporated in mainland China and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and quoted in 
Hong Kong dollars, while Red Chips are firms incorporated outside of mainland China (Hong 
Kong, Cayman Islands etc) and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as other Hong 
Kong-domiciled firms. However, Red Chips are substantially owned, either directly or 
indirectly, by the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises, and have the majority of 
their business interests located in mainland China. Therefore, both H shares and red chips 
are China-backed firms which have substantial business presence in mainland China and 
listed on the Hong Kong stock market which means subjecting to Hong Kong stock exchange 
regulations and legal environment.  
 
 
H share companies, however, have to comply additional listing and disclosure regulations 
provided by HKex, while red chips are considered as same as locally HK firms. Since H 
shares are originally incorporated in China, these firms are primarily subject to regulations 
and accounting standards in China. As a result, for HK stock market, H shares are generally 
clarified as non-HK companies which are listed on HK stock market and reconcile to HK 
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GAAPs and subject to HK regulations. Therefore, A guide for listing Chinese companies has 
been published by the SEHK (SEHK, 1996), which listed regulations as follows: 
 
 µµ35& LVVXHUV DUH H[SHFWHG WR SUHVHQW WKHLU annual accounts in accordance with Hong 
Kong or international accounting standards; 
2. The articles of association of PRC issuers must contain provisions which will reflect the 
different nature of domestic shares and overseas listed foreign shares (including H shares) 
and the different rights of their respective holders; and 
 'LVSXWHV LQYROYLQJ KROGHUV RI + VKDUHV DQG DULVLQJ IURP D 35& LVVXHU¶V DUWLFOHV RI
association, or from any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by the Company Law and 
any other relevant laws and regulations concerning the affairs of the PRC issuer, are to be 
VHWWOHGE\DUELWUDWLRQLQHLWKHU+RQJ.RQJRUWKH35&DWWKHHOHFWLRQRIWKHFODLPDQW¶¶ 
 
 
In addition, red chip firms are normally regarded to be better managed than H shares firms 
(Poon and Fung, 2000). They also state that red chips and H shares show less manipulation 
and have faster information flow than A/B shares listed on SZEX and SHEX in China because 
listing on Hong Kong markets enforce china-backed firms subject to better legal environment 
and high investor protection level. Further, Mariott (1996) indicates that red chips are better 
managed than those of the H shares since these firms are headquartered in Hong Kong and 
appointed western executives.  
 
 
In terms of legal and regulatory environment, Hong Kong stock market is regarded as a 
developed market relative to mainland China. Since Hong Kong will still use Common Law 
V\VWHPEURXJKWXSE\%ULWDLQXQGHUWKHIUDPHZRUNRI³RQHFRXQWU\WZRV\VWHPV´+RQJ.RQJ
and the mainland will be ruled by two different legal systems in terms of securities industry 
(Niu, 1997). According to Lang et al (2006), China is regarded as country with low investor 
protection, while Hong Kong is clarified as market with high investor protection. Moreover, 
Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic (2003) examine the legal environment and corporate 
governance in Asian area and conclude that Hong Kong has a relatively sound legal and 
regulatory environment in terms of Corruption, Risk of Expropriation etc, because Hong Kong 
FRQWLQXRXVO\ VWULYH WR LPSURYH LWV OHJDO HQYLURQPHQW DQG PDLQWDLQ +RQJ .RQJ DV ³$VLD¶V
ILQDQFLDOKXE´+RQJ.RQJDOVRPDGHHIIRUWVRISURWHFWLQJPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWVE\
establishing Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders. Hong Kong has been regarded 
as the second best enforcement and legal environment except Singapore in Asia 
(Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic, 2003). 
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Since the Chinese launched their stock markets in early 1990s, the stock markets are 
immature and the legal environment is weak. Although these two markets are now very active 
and develops very quickly, there is still great necessity to improve the legal enforcement and 
strengthen the investor protection. Some scholars (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) argue that a 
legal system that fails to protect minority shareholders has often been proved difficult to 
change although those countries often want to strengthen their institutions. Therefore, 
Chinese government seeks to cross list some of the good quality companies on Hong Kong 
market.  
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CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter four, I will explain the justification of the research method I deployed and 
standardise the regressions and define the variables under the regressions for four measures 
of accounting quality, which are earning smoothing, managing small positive earnings, timely 
losses recognition and value relevance. In addition, I verify the gathering process of the 
sample and matched control group as we as giving a brief description of sample 
characteristics. The next Chapter of findings will present the empirical results from the 
methods I employed and analyze the empirical results and discuss any limitations within this 
study. 
To measure the accounting quality of cross listed companies, as I mentioned before,  I will 
consider four groups of accounting quality measures that have been suggested and adopted 
by Barth et al (2008) and Lang et al (2006) Leuz (2003) and Bartov et al. (2005) etc. They are 
Earning smoothing, Managing towards positive earnings, Timely loss recognition, Value 
relevance. 
 
4.1. Overview 
Since the empirical metrics of accounting quality would be affected by other factors that might 
be correlated with the cross-listing decisions, such as economic environment and 
firm-specific variables, two main approaches will be used to mitigate these effects following 
Barth et al (2008), First, I find a matched sample from HK-domiciled companies based on 
year, industry and the firm size. The reason why to match on year, industry and size is that 
the characteristics of earnings, accruals etc are likely to be associated with industry and 
growth as well as macroeconomic differences in different years. Although some researchers 
matched their sample based on sales growth apart from year and industry, it have been 
proven that it is impossible to match both on sales growth and size simultaneously and the 
results are not sensitive to the choice of sales growth or size as one of control variables. 
(Lang et al, 2006). Therefore, I will select Hong Kong companies as matched sample whose 
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equity market value at the end of 2005 is closest to cross listed sample since Hong Kong 
market adopted new accounting standards termed as HKIAS in 2005. Following by Barth et al 
(2008), I will ensure all firm year observations for HK and cross listed firms both have data 
available. For example, if the cross listed firms only have data from 2007 through 2009, and 
its matched HK companies have data from 2005 through 2009, then I will include data from 
2007 to 2009 for my empirical analysis. 
 
Secondly, my analysis will also control other control variables that prior research has 
LGHQWLILHG DV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK FURVV OLVWLQJ GHFLVLRQ DQG ILUPV¶ DFFRXQWLQJ $FFRUGLQJ WR
Pagano et al (2002) and Lang et al (2006), the model for cross listing decision in their paper 
includes firm size, financing structure, firm growth, capital intensity, and frequency of debt 
and equity issuance. My analysis includes the log of market value of equity as of the end of 
the year because the size of cross listed companies is more likely to be large. Further, one of 
motives for cross listing is to raise capital, therefore I control for equity and debt issuance 
(percentage change in common stock and in liabilities during the period, respectively) and for 
leverage (the ratio of total liabilities to total equity). In addition, I include control for asset 
turnover (sales for the period divided by year-end total assets), since the accruals behaviour 
tends to be determined by the capital intensity of the firm. I also control for cash flow and 
growth, because accounting reporting decision could be affected by cash flows and firm 
growth.  
 
Apart from the HK-domiciled firms, my analysis will also include another group of matched 
sample from the pool of Overseas Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong stock market 
following the same matching procedure mentioned above. The Overseas Chinese companies 
are defined as Chinese companies which are registered overseas, e.g. Hong Kong, Cayman 
Island. Nevertheless, these OC firms are owned by either government, stated-owned or 
private-owned enterprises and mainly operate in the territory of mainland China. Since both 
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groups are in nature Chinese firms, it provides us an interesting setting for us to compare 
them in terms of accounting quality and whether cross listing or primarily listing in overseas 
stock market is more likely to limit management opportunism and provide more quality and 
accurate financial information to investors.  
 
4.2. Accounting quality metrics 
4.2.1. Earning smoothing 
 
The first measure for earnings smoothing is based on the volatility of earnings deflated by 
total assets, following the prior researches (Barth et al. 2008, Leuz et al. 2003, and Lang et al. 
2003). I interpret a smaller variance of the change in net income as evidence of earnings 
smoothing. Although I will control a number of variables which is associated with variability of 
earnings, the matching procedure and inclusion of control variables may not be able to 
mitigate these effects entirely. As a result, the metric is the variance of the residuals from the 
regression of change in net income on control variables following prior research (e.g. 
Ashbaugh, 2001; Pagano et al,2002, Lang et al, 2003; Lang et al, 2006). The equation (1) is 
as below: 
οNIit = Į0 + Į1 SIZEit + Į2GROWTHit + Į3EISSUEit + Į4LEVit + Į5DISSUEit + Į6TURNit +
Į7CFit + Į8AUDit + ɂit                                                (1)                        
Where: 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of end of year market value of equity;  
GROWTH = percentage change in sales;  
EISSUE = percentage change in common stock;  
LEV = end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value;  
DISSUE = percentage change in total liabilities;  
TURN = sales divided by end of year total assets; 
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CF = annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total assets; 
$8' DQLQGLFDWRUDULDEOHWKDWHTXDOVRQHLIWKHILUP¶VDXGLWRULV3Z&.30*(	<25'	7
and zero otherwise; 
 
Another metric of earning smoothing is the ratio of the variance of change in net income to 
the variance of change in net cash flows, with the variance based on the residuals from a 
regression of each variable on the control variables (Lang et al, 2006). Firms with more 
volatile cash flow stream tend to have volatile earnings accordingly. If the firms intend to 
smooth the earnings, the variability of the change in net income should be lower than that the 
variance of cash flows. Therefore, I also estimate equitation (2) similar to equation (1) with οCFit  as the dependent variable: οCFit = Ƚ0 + Ƚ1 SIZEit + Ƚ2GROWTHit + Ƚ3EISSUEit + Ƚ4LEVit + Ƚ5DISSUEit + Ƚ6TURNit +Ƚ7CFit + Ƚ8AUDit + ɂit                                                       (2)                 
The third metric for measuring earning smoothness is the Spearman correlation between 
accruals and cash flows. Since firms will respond to poor (strong) cash flow outcomes by 
increasing (decreasing) accrual, there is a negative correlation between accruals and cash 
flows. In this case, a more negative correlation is inferred that it exhibits higher level of 
earning smoothing. Again, the Spearman correlation of accruals and cash flows is the 
correlation between the residuals of accruals and net cash flows in order to mitigate the 
effects of control variables. I compare correlations of residuals from equation (3) and (4), CF* 
and ACC*. In this case, following Barth et al (2008), both CF and ACC are regressed on the 
control variables except the control variable of CF itself. 
CFit = Į0 + Į1 SIZEit + Į2GROWTHit + Į3EISSUEit + Į4LEVit + Į5DISSUEit + Į6TURNit +
Į7AUDit + İit                                                                  (3)                    
ACCit = Į0 + Į1 SIZEit +  Į2GROWTHit + Į3EISSUEit + Į4LEVit + Į5DISSUEit + Į6TURNit +
Į7AUDit + İit                                                                  (4)                    
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4.2.2. Managing toward earnings targets 
 
Another concern with earning management is a tendency of managing earnings towards 
some targets they deliberately set. The target is normally a small positive earning, according 
to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), since managers prefer to report small positive net income 
rather than negative net income. Regarding this second metric for earnings management, 
prior research has suggested to examine the coefficient on a small positive net income 
variable (SPOS) in the regression given by equation (5), which is equal to one for firm year 
observations whose annual net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01 and zero 
otherwise (Barth et al 2008; Lang et al 2003, 2006). A positive coefficient of SPOS can be 
interpreted as of a tendency to manage toward earnings targets more frequently than do 
Hong Kong (Overseas Chinese) firms. The reason why using the coefficient on SPOS from 
equation (5UDWKHUWKDQGLUHFWO\FRPSDULQJWKHILUPV¶SHUFHQWDJHVRIVPDOOSRVLWLYHLQFRPHis 
that the matching procedure may not eliminate differences in economic factors associated 
with firms which is cross listed.  
 
CLISTሺ0,1ሻ = Į0 + Į1SPOS + Į2 SIZEit + Į3GROWTHit + Į4EISSUEit + Į5LEVit + Į6DISSUEit +
Į7TURNit + Į8CFit + Į9AUDit + ɂit                                                (5)                 
 
CLIST = an indicator variable that equals one for cross-listed firms and zero for HK firms,  
 
4.2.3. Timely loss recognition  
 
Another metric of accounting quality is to examine if the firms recognise their large loss timely. 
Prior research (Lang et al, 2003; Leuz, et al, 2003 and Barth et al, 2008) indicates managers 
tend to defer the effects of large losses to future multiple periods rather than revealing them 
as they occur. This paper measures timely loss recognition as the coefficient on large 
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negative net income, LNEG, in the regressions given by equation (6), LNEG is an indicator 
set to one for observations for which annual net income scaled by total assets is less than 
-0.20 and set to zero otherwise. If the coefficient of LNEG is negative, I infer that the cross 
listed firms report large losses less frequently than Hong Kong firms (Overseas Chinese 
firms). 
CLISTሺ0,1ሻ = Į0 + Į1LNEG + Į2 SIZEit +  Į3GROWTHit + Į4EISSUEit + Į5LEVit + Į6DISSUEit +
Į7TURNit + Į8CFit + Į9AUDit + İit                                       (6) 
 
4.2.4. Value relevance  
Finally, this study considers the value relevance of accounting amounts, which refers to 
predicted association with equity market values (Barth et al, 2001). The more value relevant 
of accounting data, the higher accounting quality it possesses. However, if the value 
relevance tests provide a higher association with share prices or return, they suggest that 
accounting data are more informative rather than actual information content of accounting 
data (Lang et al, 2006). The first approach I use is based on the association between 
accounting data and market share price. The first metric to measure is the adjusted R square 
value from the regression given by equation (7). In the equation, Pit is the share price of six 
months after fiscal year-end to make sure the accounting information is fully perceived by the 
public (Lang et al, 2003; Lang et al, 2006 and Barth et al, 2008). 
Pit = Į0 + Į1BVPSit + Į2 NIPSit + İit                                             (7)             
 
%936 ERRNYDOXHRIVKDUHKROGHUV¶HTXLW\SHUVKDUHDQG  
NIPS =net income per share.  
 
 
The second and third value relevance metrics are from regressions of net income per share 
on annual stock return. Since Ball et al (2000) argued that managers have less incentives to 
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manage earnings since good news are certainly recognised once they are available, whereas 
firms are more likely to manage in cases of bad news. Therefore, earnings return relation will 
be examined separately for positive and negative return subgroups (Barth et al, 2008). I 
regress net income per share divided by beginning of year price, NIPS/PI on annual stock 
return, RETURN. Following Lang et al (2006) and Barth et al (2008), RETURN is defined as 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stock price three months after fiscal year-end to the 
stock price nine months before fiscal year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock splits. In 
addition, Brown et al (1999) indicated that the scale issues related to mean difference in 
terms of general price levels will affect the value relevance metrics. Hence, I will deflate all 
variables by price as of six months after the preceding year-end as suggested in prior 
research (Brown et al, 1999; Lang et al, 2006). My second and third value relevance metrics 
are the R2 values from the regression given by equation (8) estimated for good news and bad 
news. If R2 is lower for cross listed firms, cross listed companies have lower level of value 
relevance with stock price than Hong Kong firms (Overseas Chinese firms). 
 
[NIPS/P]it = Į0 + Į1RETURNit + İit                                                (8)                
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4.3.  DATA  
 
Our sample consists of 235 cross listed firm-years observations (49 firms) on Hong Kong 
stock market.  All of them are H shares which both list on Chinese stock markets (Shanghai 
or Shenzhen stock markets) and Hong Kong stock market. I obtain this sample from the 
Datastream for the period of 2005 to 2009, since new accounting standards of HKFRSs 
became effective since 1st January 2005. Further, I compare the cross-listed firms with two 
different matched groups, which are Hong Kong domiciled firms and Overseas Chinese firms. 
The latter group of Overseas Chinese firms are firms incorporated overseas, mainly in Hong 
Kong. The majority of overseas companies are red chips, which is directly or indirectly owned 
by Chinese governments, while all the cross listed firms are H shares. Regarding the 
matching process, I only find 46 HK firms and 43 OC firms matched for the sample 
respectively due to data limit. For example, Oil industry is monopolized by government; 
hence there are no matched firms from local Hong Kong firms for the sample.  In addition, I 
have all the variables in the dataset winsorized at the 1% level in order to mitigate the effects 
of outliers on our inferences.2 
 
Table 1 includes descriptive data for my sample firms in terms of industry breakdown.  There 
are 19 different industries in my sample, which represents a wide spread of industries. Most 
of them are in manufacturing and construction.  
 
 
 
 
                                          
2 Since my sample size is limited, one concern about winsorizing data is that doing so will 
drop some useful variables which are a part of data set. I repeat the methodology without 
winsorizing all the variables beforehand, the results are insensitive to the inferences. 
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Table 1: Industry breakdown for cross listed firms 
 No. of 
Observations 
Percentage 
of 
Observations 
NO. 
of 
Cross 
Listed 
Firms 
Percentage 
of Cross 
Listed 
Firms 
Banks 30 12.24% 6 12.24% 
Beverages 5 2.04% 1 2.04% 
Chemicals 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Construction & Materials 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Electricity 15 6.12% 3 6.12% 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 5 2.04% 1 2.04% 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 5 2.04% 1 2.04% 
Household Goods & Home 
Construction 
5 2.04% 1 2.04% 
Industrial Engineering 30 12.24% 6 12.24% 
Industrial Metals & Mining 25 10.20% 5 10.20% 
Industrial Transportation 25 10.20% 5 10.20% 
Life Insurance 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Mining 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Oil & Gas Producers 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Oil Equipment & Services 5 2.04% 1 2.04% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Real Estate Investment & Service 5 2.04% 1 2.04% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 10 4.08% 2 4.08% 
Travel & Leisure 20 8.16% 4 8.16% 
Total 245 100% 49 100% 
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Table 2 shows descriptive information on the test and control variables for the cross listed 
firms and matched Hong Kong domiciled firms. Since the sample is matched based on firm 
size at the end of 2005, the two samples are similar in terms of firm size. However, the mean 
of firm size across the two samples is statistically different at 10% significance level and 
median leverage is higher for the cross-listed firms than for the matched HK sample. Although 
both equity issuance and debt issuance are not statistically different for the two samples, the 
mean and median difference between these two groups are quite large, and HK-domiciled 
sample shows substantially larger standard deviation. Leverage is significantly higher for the 
listed firms than HK sample in terms of both the mean and the median, which implies that 
cross listed firms are more risky. The mean of cross listed firms is as high as 2.34, although 
the variance of leverage among cross listed firms are also much larger. Asset turnover of 
cross listed firms is not significantly smaller than the US firms; however, it appears that HK 
firms are more capital intensive. Finally, the cross-listed firms have significantly larger cash 
flow stream from operating activities compared with the HK firms. 
 
Turning to test variables, the change in net income is higher for cross listed firms, although the 
difference is not significant; it implies that the growth in profits was higher than HK firms. The 
standard deviation of HK firms is much larger than cross listed firms, although we have not 
controlled the control variables yet. The difference in change in operating cash flow is 
significantly larger for HK firms, which is consistent with higher mean accruals for the HK firms. 
Furthermore, cross listed firms have significantly more small positive net income observations, 
while cross listed sample shows significantly less large negative net income observations at 
significance level of 10%. Lastly, average return for cross listed firms are as high as 15%, 
which is significantly higher than nearly 0% return for OC firms. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics of Cross listed firms versus. HK firms  
Variable Cross listed firms HK firms 
Control variablesMean  Median  S. D.  Mean  Median  S.D. 
SIZE  15.57  15.61 2.14 15.28** 15.13 2.31 
GROWTH  0.22  0.17 0.46 0.38 0.98* 3.62 
EISSUE 0.13  0.09 0.56 -0.24 0.10 7.89 
DISSUE 0.94  0.14 6.09 6.32 0.07 63.01 
LEV 2.34  0.52 17.56 0.66** 0.40* 1.58 
ATURN  0.64  0.55 0.51 0.72 0.52 0.84 
AUD  0.67  1 0.47 0.87* 1 0.34 
CF 0.06  0.05 0.08 0.04** 0.44 0.18 
Test variables        
CHANGE_NI 0.00 0.00 0.09 - 0.05 0.00* 0.45 
CHANGE_CF 0.00  0.00 0.08 0.41** 0.00 0.38 
ACC -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.01* 0.26 
CF 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.44 0.18 
SPOS 0.16 0 0.37 0.10* 0* 0.31 
LNEG 0.02 0 0.13 0.04** 0 0.20 
RETURN  0.15 0.22 0.65 0.00* 0.03* 0.77 
NIPS 0.08 0.02 0.19 -79.69 0.01 1392.22 
P 6.78 4.24 7.73 20.13* 4.48 31.31 
NIPS/P  0.02 0.00 0.07 -293.19 0.00** 3769.22 
BVPS 3.03 2.85 1.90 9.92* 3.13 14.20 
*, ** indicates significantly different from CL and HK firms at the 1%, 5% level, 
respectively (two-tailed) 
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Similarly, Table 3 shows the descriptive information on the test and control variables for the 
cross listed firms and another matched sample of overseas Chinese firms. The both mean 
and median of firm size are significantly larger for Cross listed firms, although I included the 
overseas Chinese firms based on the criterion of similar size. It may be because there are 
limited overseas Chinese firms (less than 100 red chips firms listing on Hong Kong markets, 
other non-government owned firms are normally smaller in terms of size). The leverage mean 
for OC firms is at 0.43 compared to 2.43 of cross listed firms, which are significantly smaller 
than cross listed firms. Cash flow from operating activities is significantly larger for cross 
listed firms and the return for cross listed firms are slightly higher than OC firms. Also, similar 
to HK sample, OC firms shows less small income observations and more large negative 
losses than cross listed firms. Generally speaking, it seems that OC firms shows more similar 
characteristics to HK firms, although both cross listed and OC firms are both China-backed 
and considerably influenced by Chinese governments. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Cross listed firms versus. Overseas Chinese firms 
Variable Cross listed firms Overseas Chinese firms 
Control variables  Mean  Median  S.D. Mean  Median  S.D. 
SIZE  15.41 15.51 2.04 14.66* 14.50* 2.06 
GROWTH  0.22  0.17 0.46 2.37* 0.12 18.04 
EISSUE 0.12  0.09 0.55 1.14* 0.13* 7.72 
DISSUE 1.44  0.13 9.93 0.93 0.08 4.10 
LEV 2.39  0.50 18.16 0.43** 0.26* 0.74 
ATURN  0.69  0.58 0.49 0.60** 0.37* 0.79 
AUD  0.65 1 0.48 0.86* 1 0.35 
CF 0.07  0.06 0.08 0.04* 0.05 0.15 
Test variables        
CHANGE_NI 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.37 
CHANGE_CF 0.00  0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 
ACC -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.26 
CF 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04* 0.05 0.15 
SPOS 0.10 0 0.30 0.06** 0 0.24 
LNEG 0.02 0 0.14 0.07* 0* 0.25 
RETURN  0.16 0.25 0.66 0.13* 0.17 0.85 
NIPS 0.07 0.02 0.19 -24.84* 0.06* 138.92 
P 7.41 4.62 8.36 4.89* 2.46* 6.55 
NIPS/P  0.02 0.00 0.07 -74.62* 0.02* 574.26 
BVPS 3.17 2.97 1.97 2.51* 1.48* 3.20 
*, ** indicates significantly different from CL and OC firms at the 1%, 5% level, 
respectively (two-tailed) 
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CHAPTER FIVE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Findings on comparison of Cross listed firms and Hong Kong firms 
 
Table 4, through Panel A to panel D presents my empirical results for earnings smoothing, 
managing toward earnings targets, timely loss recognition and value relevance. The 
predictions for all measures are also included in Table 4. Consistent with the predictions, 
Table 4 reveals that firms cross list in general evidence more earnings smoothing and 
managing toward small positive earnings, less timely loss recognition, and more value 
relevance of accounting data than do the HK firms. 
 
 
Results for three metrics of earnings smoothing are reported in panel A. In terms of variability 
of net income, the results in panel A suggest that earnings are less volatile for the mainland 
China firms cross list than for the HK firms, after controlling for other variables. The variability 
of net income for the HK firms is considerably greater than for the cross-listed firms, and this 
difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
Secondly, tests on the ratio of earnings variability to cash flow variability show consistent 
conclusion with Variability of net income. Since cash flow variability (not tabulated) is similar 
for the two samples the after controlling for other factors, the ratio of net income variability to 
cash flow variability leads to similar conclusions to those for net income variability. It is 
impossible to test the statistical differences between these ratios of variances in Stata, 
however, the ratio of net income variability to cash flow variability is substantially lower for the 
cross-listed firms(1.8568) than for the HK firms(5.0074) and the variability of change in cash 
flow is statistically significant at 0.01 level. Therefore, it implies that the smoother earnings 
observed for the cross-listed firms is not resulted from a smoother cash flow stream, but 
UDWKHULVFDXVHGE\WKHPDQDJHUV¶PDQLSXODWLRQRQDFFUXDOVWRVPRRWKWKHHDUQLQJV  
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The third metric is the spearman correlation between cash flows and accruals which intend to 
include the effects of accruals. Given that cash flow and accruals are negatively correlated, 
panel A in Table 3 shows us that cross-listed firms have higher magnitude of spearman 
correlation at 0.6022, which suggests that cross listed firms are more likely to use accruals to 
smooth earnings than HK firms. The difference on correlation between cash flows and 
accruals is statistically significant. All of three metrics are consistent with my predictions, 
which show that overall there is more earning smoothing for the cross listed firms relative to 
HK firms.  
 
 
Regarding to earning management, another dimension is to explore that whether the cross 
listed firms are more frequent to manage toward small positive earnings targets. Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) as well as other following researchers have argued that managers prefer 
to manage towards small positive earnings. Results on small positive earnings (SPOS) are 
showed in Panel B of Table 3. The results are consistent with my predictions that cross listed 
firms are more likely to manage towards small positive earnings than HK firms. The result 
conditional on control variables is also in line with the descriptive results in Table 2, the 
frequency of small positive earnings observations is significantly higher for cross-listed firms 
relative to HK firms.  
 
 
Table 4, panel C represents the test on timely loss recognition. The result indicate that HK 
firms are more willing to disclosure large losses than cross listed, while cross listed firms 
more likely to avoid reporting large losses. Overall, the tests of timely loss recognition are 
closely related to earning smoothing, since large losses should be relatively rare if earning 
are smoothed(Barth et al, 2008). The result on large losses recognition supports the evidence 
on previous earning smoothing, which suggest that cross listed firms smooth and spread the 
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earnings over multi-period and therefore dilute the large negative earnings and manage 
toward small positive earnings. 
 
The final tests examine the value relevance of accounting data to stock markets. In panel D in 
table 4, the first metric is from regressing price on earnings and book value for the HK firms 
with the cross listed firms. The adjusted R2 is significantly greater for HK firms at 69.15% 
compared to 49.39% of cross listed firms. These results indicate that 69.15% the stock prices 
can be explained by earnings and book value for HK firms, which is more value relevant for 
HK than cross listed firms. 
 
Also, Table 4, Panel D provides the results from regression earnings on returns. The tests are 
based on two subgroups on good and bad news, according to Ball et al. (2000), the 
association between earnings and returns is 1.06 % for the HK firms, which is higher than for 
the cross-listed firms for good news, 0.06%. Conversely, HK firms show lower R2 at 0.31% 
compared to 1.42% from cross listed firms. However, the results for both good and bad news 
are not statistically significant.  
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Table 4: Accounting quality analysis of Cross listed (CL) firms and matched-HK (HK) 
firms  
Measures Prediction Cross listers  
(N=230) 
HK firms  
(N=230) 
    Panel A: Earnings smoothing     
Variability of ǻ1,  CL<HK  0.0070 0.0402* 
Variability of ǻ1,RYHUǻ&)  CL<HK 1.8568 5.0074*  
Correlation of ACC*and CF*  CL<HK - 0.6068 - 0.5079 
 
   Panel B: Managing towards positive earnings     
Small Positive NI (SPOS) Positive 0.0628 
 
  
Panel C: Timely loss recognition     
Large Negative NI (LNEG) Negative           -0.0596 
 
  
Panel D: Value Relevance     
Regression R2     
 
   
Price  CL<HK 0.4939 0.6915 
Good News  CL<HK 0.0006 0.0106 
Bad News  CL<HK 0.0142 0.0031 
*Indicates significant difference between CL and HK firms at the 1% level (one-tailed) 
Note: the R2 in the table 4 and 5 is adjusted R2 for Price and R2 for Return regression (good 
and bad news) respectively 
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5.2. Findings on comparison of Cross listed firms and Overseas Chinese firms 
Table 5, provides the results for earning smoothing, managing toward small positive earnings, 
timely loss recognition, and value relevance for cross listed and overseas Chinese firms. 
Similar to the preceding findings for comparison of cross listed and HK firms, cross listed 
firms exhibit more earning smoothing, higher frequency of small positive earnings 
observations, less  timely loss recognition and lower association between accounting 
amounts and stock prices.   
 
The first finding relate to earnings smoothing shows that Cross listed firms exhibit a 
significantly lower variance of the change in net income than Overseas Chinese firms, 0.0070 
versus 0.0317. The second finding indicates that the ratio of the variance of change in net 
income to the variance of the change in cash flow is significantly higher for OC firms than 
cross listed firms. In addition, the third metric is also consistent with my prediction, presenting 
more negative correlation between ACC and CF for cross listed firms than OC firms, which 
implies cross listed firms are more likely to respond to poor cash flow outcomes by increasing 
accruals. Overall, Overseas Chinese firms evidence substantially less earning smoothing 
than cross listed firms. Interestingly, Overseas Chinese firms exhibit smaller variability of 
change in net income; more negative correlation than Hong Kong firms. Although Hong Kong 
firms and overseas group are not directly compared, it is suggestive of more managerial 
incentives on managing earnings for Overseas Chinese firms than Hong Kong firms. 
However, the results on the ratio of variability of change in net income over the variability of 
change in cash flow contrasts the prediction Hong Kong firms have less earning smoothing 
than Overseas Chinese firms since Overseas Chinese firms are essential Chinese firms 
which operate in Chinese legal environment and share similar management style.   
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In table 5, Panel B presents that the coefficient on SPOS, 0.0282, is insignificantly different 
from zero. Although the results is not statistically significant, it may suggest that cross listed 
firms report more frequent small positive net income than Overseas Chinese firms.  
 
Thirdly, in Panel C, the finding on timely loss recognition indicates that the LNEG coefficient, 
-0.1713, is significantly different from zero. This finding suggests that cross listed firms is 
more likely to avoid recognising large losses, while Overseas Chinese firms may recognise 
large losses more frequently.  
 
In panel D in table 5, the findings relate to value relevance of accounting data to stock 
markets. The adjusted R2 is substantially greater for Overseas Chinese firms at 66.94% 
compared to 47.46% of cross listed firms, which means earnings and book value for 
Overseas Chinese firms are highly associated with stock prices, while Cross listed firms 
seem to have relatively lower informative accounting data to investors and equity market. 
With comparison between Hong Kong firms and Overseas Chinese firms, the accounting 
data from two groups are both highly value relevant with stock market, at 69.15% and 66.94% 
respectively for Hong Kong firms and Overseas Chinese firms. it might be because that 
Overseas Chinese firms reports their financial statements as same as Hong Kong firms while 
Cross listed firms provide reconciliation to Hong Kong accounting standards which lower the 
YDOXHUHOHYDQFHRIFURVVOLVWHGILUPV¶DFFRXQWLQJGDWD 
 
 
In addition, value relevance tests on returns to good and bad news present limited findings, 
since the adjusted R2 is quite low in this case, which suggests relatively low association 
between accounting information and equity market. The adjusted R2 from the regression of 
earnings on returns is 7.23% for the Overseas Chinese firms, which is higher than for the 
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cross-listed firms for good news, which is at 0.69 %. In contrast, cross listed firms have higher 
adjusted R2 at 0.07% compared to 1.08% for Overseas Chinese firms.  
Table 5: Accounting quality analysis of Cross listed firms (CL) and matched-Overseas 
Chinese (OC) firms  
Measures Prediction Cross listers  
(N=215) 
OC firms  
(N=215) 
Panel A: Earnings smoothing     
Variability of ǻ1,  CL<OC  0.0070  0.0317* 
Variability of ǻ1,RYHUǻ&)  CL<OC 1.8035 6.7600 * 
Correlation of ACC*and CF*  CL<OC - 0.6022 - 0.5768 
 
   Panel B: Managing towards positive earnings     
Small Positive NI (SPOS) Positive 0.0282 
 
  
Panel C: Timely loss recognition     
Large Negative NI (LNEG) Negative           -0.1713# 
 
  
Panel D: Value Relevance     
 
   Regression R2     
 
   Price  CL<OC 0.4746 0.6694 
Good News  CL<OC 0.0069 0.0723 
Bad News  CL<OC 0.0108 0.0007 
*Indicates significant difference between CL and HK firms at the 1% level (one-tailed) 
#
 indicates significantly different from zero at the 1% level (one-sided) 
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5.3. Discussion: 
Overall, findings for cross listed firms provide suggestive evidence that cross listed firms 
exhibited lower accounting quality than both Hong Kong firms and Overseas Chinese firms, 
which is consistent the other studies on cross listing e.g. Siegel (2005) and Lang et al (2006) 
that cross listing provides limited improvement on the quality of financial reports although 
cross listed firms are nominally same in legal forms since cross listed firms committed 
themselves to provide reconciliation to newly published HKFRSs and subject to oversights of 
Hong Kong equity market. In addition, surprisingly, the Overseas Chinese firms evidence 
substantially higher quality of accounting data than cross listed firms and similar accounting 
quality to Hong Kong firms although Overseas Chinese firms and Hong Kong firms are 
indirectly compared without statistical significance tests. Therefore, it suggests that 
accounting quality can be enhanced substantially by making greater commitment to converge 
to strong enforcement and higher standards of corporate governance. Regarding to the 
Overseas Chinese firms, most of them are registered in Hong Kong and primarily listed on 
Hong Kong stock market, which are subject to completely same legal environment and 
regulatory enforcement as other Hong Kong - domiciled firms. Another explanation, 
according to Mariott (1996), is that overseas Chinese firms normally appointed western 
executives and therefore are better managed than those of domestic Chinese firms. As a 
result, it might lead to less management incentives for Overseas Chinese firms than cross 
listed domestic Chinese firms. 
 
 
As Siegel (2005) stated that some regulations are simply difficult to be strictly enforced 
across borders due to foreign jurisdiction issue. He further indicated that the governors are 
not willing to devote the scare resources to enforce additional requirements or regulations on 
cross listed firms. In my study, it seems that the lax regulatory enforcement is the critical 
obstacle preventing cross listed firms benefiting from cross listing. On the other hand, the 
identical regulatory enforcement and legal environment as Hong Kong firms ensure a 
rigorous governance environment for the Overseas Chinese firms and hence facilitate the 
improvement on quality of financial reporting. However, it requires further research on direct 
comparison between Hong Kong±domicile firms and Overseas Chinese firms to shed light on 
the effects of overseas registration and listing on accounting quality.  
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5.4. Limitation  
 
When comparing the accounting quality metrics for two groups of firms, the approach I 
implemented produced significant differences in summary statistics between the groups. E.g. 
the variance of net income is significantly different between the cross listed firms and Hong 
Kong firms. These findings on statistical significance between two groups are based on the 
assumption that the metrics for firms within each group are drawn from the same sample 
distribution. However, firms in different groups potentially follow different sample distributions, 
which alleviate the validity of the metrics results I generated. Although I can infer from the 
differences of metrics between two groups without statistical tests for significance level, it is 
difficult to examine the extent that the accounting quality differs in each group since the 
results are not statistically comparable. 
 
 
Another concern has been raised regarding the relatively small size of sample. There are only 
49 firms which cross listing on both Chinese domestic equity markets and Hong Kong equity 
markets and 245 firm-year observations in total for the cross listed firms. More importantly, 
most of the cross listed firms are state-owned enterprises therefore governments may impose 
a great impact on the decision making in financial reporting, while the majority of Hong Kong 
firms are not.  
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CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSTION 
 
The aims of my dissertation is to examine the characteristics of accounting data for 
cross-listed firms in terms of accounting quality and whether the firms cross list could benefit 
from cross listing by bonding themselves to more rigorous legal force and high investor 
protection environment. The results of this dissertation shows that, through four measures of 
accounting quality, the cross-listed firms is more likely to smooth earnings, and more frequent 
to manage toward small positive earnings, less frequent to recognize large losses and a lower 
value relevance with share price. Although the four measures of accounting quality are rather 
indirect, these results at least show some evidence that there is limited improvement in 
accounting quality resulted from the effect of cross listing. These results are consistent with 
prior research like Leuz et al. (2003) and Lang et al (2006) that firms in weak investor 
protection and lax regulatory enforcement environment presents more evidence of earning 
management and lower quality of accounting data.  
 
Further, one surprising finding on the comparisons of cross listed firms and overseas Chinese 
firms indicates that entirely committing to strong regulatory oversights and rigorous legal 
environment is considerably conducive to higher quality reporting information although cross 
listed firms and overseas Chinese firms are both China-back firms with major presence in 
mainland China. These findings on Overseas Chinese firms suggest that the quality financial 
reports are mainly influenced by the local reporting environment and regulatory enforcement, 
from which cross listed firms can not benefit since these firms primarily reports under Chinese 
financial regulations and only provide reconciliations to Hong Kong accounting standards. 
 
My study may provide some empirical implications for standard setters, especially for 
Chinese mainland. The convergence of accounting standards to IFRSs is not sufficient since 
it only provide formal institutions. Despite of the high quality of accounting standards, it still 
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needs a rigorous legal and litigation environment to ensure the strict enforcement of these 
regulations. Otherwise, informal applications of these rules will easily cause the managerial 
manipulation and hence low quality of financial reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
References: 
 
$VKEDXJK+µ1RQ-86)LUPV¶$FFRXQWLQJ6WDQGDUG&KRLFHV¶Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 20: 129±53. 
 
Ashbaugh, H. and. Pincus 0  µ'RPHVWLF $FFRXQWLQJ 6WDQGDUGV ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
$FFRXQWLQJ6WDQGDUGVDQGWKH3UHGLFWDELOLW\RI(DUQLQJV¶Journal of Accounting Research, 
39: 417± 34. 
 
%DOO 5 DQG 6KLYDNXPDU /  µ(DUQLQJV TXDOLW\ LQ 8. SULYDWH ILUPV¶ Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 39:83±128. 
 
%DOO 5 5RQELQ $ DQG :8 - 6  µ,QFHQWLYHV YHUVXV 6WDQGDUGV 3URSHUWLHV RI
$FFRXQWLQJ,QFRPHLQ)RXU(DVW$VLDQ&RXQWULHV¶Journal of Accounting & Economics, 36: 
235±70. 
%DOO 5  µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO )LQDQFLDO 5HSRUWLQJ 6WDQGDUGV ,)56 SURV DQG FRQV IRU
LQYHVWRUV¶Accounting and Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum. pp. 
5-27.  
 
%DUWK 0 ( %HDYHU : + DQG /DQGVPDQ : 5  µ7KH 5HOHYDQFH of the Value 
5HOHYDQFH/LWHUDWXUHIRU$FFRXQWLQJ6WDQGDUG6HWWLQJ$QRWKHU9LHZ¶Journal of Accounting 
& Economics, 31, 77±104. 
 
%DUWK0(.RQFKLWFKLN< DQG/DQGVPDQ:5  µ&RVW RI&DSLWDO DQG)LQDQFLDO
6WDWHPHQW 7UDQVSDUHQF\¶ :RUNLQJ SDSHr, Stanford University and University of North 
Carolina. 
 
53 
 
%DUWRY6DQG*ROGEHUJ5µ&RPSDUDWLYHYDOXHUHOHYDQFHDPRQJ*HUPDQ86DQG
,QWHUQDWLRQDO $FFRXQWLQJ 6WDQGDUGV $ *HUPDQ VWRFN PDUNHW SHUVSHFWLYH¶ Journal of 
Accounting Auditing & Finance 20 (2): 95±119 
 
%HEFKXN/DQG5RH0µ$WKHRU\RISDWKGHSHQGHQFHLQFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHDQG
RZQHUVKLS¶Stanford Law Review, 52, 127±170. 
 
 
%UDGVKDZ0DQG0LOOHU*µ:LOOKDUPRQL]LQJDFFRXQWLQJVWDQGDUGVUHDOO\KDUPRQL]H
accounting? Evidence from non-86 ILUPV DGRSWLQJ 86 *$$3¶ :RUNLQJ SDSHU +DUYDUG
Business School. 
 
%URZQ6/R.DQG/\V7µ8VHRI5LQDFFRXQWLQJUHVHDUFKPHDVXULQJFKDQJHV
LQ YDOXH UHOHYDQFH RYHU WKH ODVW IRXU GHFDGHV¶ Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 
(2):83-115 
 
%XUJVWDKOHU'DQG',&+(9,µ(DUQLQJV0DQDJHPHQWWR$YRLG(DUQLQJV'HFUHDVHV
DQG/RVVHV¶Journal of Accounting & Economics 24: 99±126. 
 
%XUJVWDKOHU ' +DLO / DQG /HX] &  µ7KH ,PSRUWDQFH RI 5HSRUWLQJ ,QFHQWLves: 
(DUQLQJV0DQDJHPHQW LQ(XURSHDQ3ULYDWHDQG3XEOLF)LUPV¶The Accounting Review 81: 
983±1016. 
 
&KHQ+7DQJ4-LDQJ<DQG/LQ=µ0DQGDWRU\,)56$GRSWLRQDQG$FFRXQWLQJ
4XDOLW\(YLGHQFHIURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶:RUNLQJ3DSHU>2QOLQe]Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1330352> 
 
54 
 
&KHQ 6 6XQ = DQG :DQJ <  µ(YLGHQFH IURP &KLQD RQ ZKHWKHU KDUPRQL]HG
DFFRXQWLQJ VWDQGDUGV KDUPRQL]HV DFFRXQWLQJ SUDFWLFHV¶ Accounting Horizons, 16(3), 
í 
&KHQ <*  µ7KH SULQFLSOHV IRU &KLQHVHDFFRXQWLQJ VWDQGDUGV¶ Accounting Reform 
and Accounting Administration, edited by Accounting Regulatory Department of Ministry of 
Finance. Beijing, China: Department of Administration of Accounting Affairs. 
 
CKULVWHQVHQ+/HH(DQG:DONHU0 µ,QFHQWLYHVRUVWDQGDUGVZKDWGHWHUPLQHV
DFFRXQWLQJTXDOLW\FKDQJHVDURXQG,)56DGRSWLRQ"¶:RUNLQJSDSHU0DQFKHVWHU$FFRXQWLQJ
and Finance Group and Manchester Business School. 
 
Claessens.S., Djankov.S. and .OLQJHELHO'µ6WRFN0DUNHWVLQ7UDQVLWLRQ(FRQRPLHV¶
Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 5, World Bank 
 
&RIIHH -  µ5DFLQJ WRZDUGV WKH WRS" WKH LPSDFW RI FURVV-listing and stock market 
competition on international corporate governancH¶:RUNLQJSDSHU&ROXPELD8QLYHUVLW\/DZ
School. 
 
'DVNH+ µ(FRQRPLF%HQHILWVRI$GRSWLQJ,)56RU86-GAAP²Have the Expected 
&RVWVRI(TXLW\&DSLWDO5HDOO\'HFUHDVHG"¶Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33: 
329±73. 
 
Daske, H. and GebharGW*µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO5HSRUWLQJ6WDQGDUGVDQG([SHUWV
3HUFHSWLRQVRI'LVFORVXUH4XDOLW\$EDFXV¶Accounting Horizons, 42 (3-4): 461-498, 
 
'DVNH++DLO//HX]&DQG9HUGL5µ0DQGDWRU\,)56UHSRUWLQJDURXQGWKHZRUOG
early HYLGHQFH RQ WKH HFRQRPLF FRQVHTXHQFHV¶ Journal of Accounting Research 46 (5): 
1085-1142 
 
55 
 
'HFKRZ305LFKDUGVRQ6$DQG7XQD,µ:K\DUHHDUQLQJVDUHNLQN\"$Q
H[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHHDUQLQJVPDQDJHPHQWH[SODQDWLRQ¶Review of Accounting Studies 8: 
355-384. 
 
'HFKRZ3056ORDQDQG$6ZHHQH\  µ'HWHFWLQJHDUQLQJVPDQDJHPHQW¶The 
Accounting Review, 70 (2): 193-226. 
 
'H)RQG 0 / DQG -LDPEDOYR -  µ'HEW FRYHQDQW YLRODWLRQ DQG PDQLSXODWLRQ RI
$FFUXDOV¶Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 145-176. 
 
'HORLWWH7RXFKH7RKPDWVXµ)56VLQ\RXUSRFNHW¶>2QOLQH@$YDLODEOHDW  
<www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pocket2008.pdf>. 
 
'RLGJH&.DURO\L.DQG6WXO]5 µ:K\DUHIRUHLJQILUPVOLVWHGLQWKHU.S. worth 
PRUH"¶Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205±238. 
 
'RLGJH&µ86FURVV-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual 
FODVVILUPV¶Journal of Financial Economics 72, 519±553. 
 
 
(FFKHU ( DQG +HDO\ 3  µ7he Role of International Accounting Standards in 
7UDQVLWLRQDO (FRQRPLHV $ 6WXG\ RI WKH 3HRSOH
V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD¶ :RUNLQJ SDSHU
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
(ZHUW 5 DQG :DJHQKRIHUZ $  µ(FRQRPLF (IIHFWV RI 7LJKWHQLQJ $FFRXQWLQJ
StaQGDUGVWR5HVWULFW(DUQLQJV0DQDJHPHQW¶The Accounting Review, 43: 1101±24. 
 
)DQWR-µ7KHDEVHQFHRIFURVV-cultural communication: SEC mandatory disclosure 
DQGIRUHLJQFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH¶Journal of International Law and Business 17, 119±207. 
56 
 
 
)UDQFLV-/D)RQG52OVVRQ3DQG6FKLSSHU.µ7KHPDUNHWSULFLQJRIDFFUXDOV 
4XDOLW\¶Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39: 295-327. 
 
)URVW&DQG3RZQDOO*µ$FFRXQWLQJGLVFORVXUHSUDFWLFHVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG
the UnitHG.LQJGRP¶Journal of Accounting Research, 32 (1), 75±102. 
 
+DUULV 06 DQG 0XOOHU ,,, . $  µ7KH PDUNHW YDOXDWLRQ RI ,$6 YHUVXV 86-GAAP 
accounting measures using Form 20-)UHFRQFLOLDWLRQV¶Journal of Accounting & Economics 
26 (1±3):285±312. 
 
+RQJ.RQJ&HUWLILHG3XEOLF$FFRXQWDQW+.&3$¶2YHUYLHZ¶>2QOLQH@$YDLODEOHDW 
< http://www.hkicpa.org.hk/en/about-us/organization/overview/> 
 
+RUWRQ - DQG 6HUDIHLP *  µ0DUNHW UHVSRQVH WR DQG WKH YDOXH UHOHYDQFH RI
reconciliation adjuVWPHQWV IURP 8. *$$3 WR ,)56 *$$3 )LUVW HYLGHQFH IURP WKH 8.¶
Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming.  
 
,$6%Dµ$ERXWWKH,)56)RXQGDWLRQVDQGWKH,$6%¶>2QOLQH@$YDLODEOHDW 
< http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm> 
 
IASB, Eµ,)56VDURXQGWKHZRUOG
>2QOLQH@$YDLODEOHDW 
<http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+IASB/IFRSs+aroimd+the+world.htm> 
 
International accounting standards committee (1989), Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements. London, UK: IASC. 
 
.ULVKQDPXUWL & 6HYLF $ DQG 6HYLF =  µ/HJDO HQYLURQPHQW ILUP-level corporate 
JRYHUQDQFHDQGH[SURSULDWLRQRIPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUVLQ$VLD¶Working Paper. Singapore: 
Nanyang Technological University. 
57 
 
 
Lang, M., Raedy, JDQG:LOVRQ:µ(DUQLQJV0DQDJHPHQWDQG&URVV/LVWLQJ$UH
5HFRQFLOHG(DUQLQJV&RPSDUDEOH WR86(DUQLQJV"¶Journal of Accounting and Economics 
42: 255±83. 
 
/DQJ05DHG\-<HWPDQ0µ+RZUHSUHVHQWDWLYHDUHILUPVWKDWDUHFURVVOLsted in 
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV"$QDQDO\VLVRIDFFRXQWLQJTXDOLW\¶Journal of Accounting Research, 41, 
363±386. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-6LODQHV)6KOHLIHU$DQG9LVKQ\5µ,QYHVWRUSURWHFWLRQ
DQGFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH¶Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3±27. 
 
/HX] &  µ,$6 YHUVXV 86 *$$3 ,QIRUPDWLRQ $V\PPHWU\-Based Evidence from 
*HUPDQ\¶V1HZ0DUNHW¶Journal of Accounting Research, 41: 445±27. 
 
/HYLWW$µ7KH,PSRUWDQFHRI+LJK4XDOLW\$FFRXQWLQJ6WDQGDUGV¶>2QOLQH@$YDLlable 
at: 
< http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spch176.txt> 
 
/LFKW $  µ*HQLH LQ D ERWWOH" $VVHVVLQJ PDQDJHULDO RSSRUWXQLVP LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
VHFXULWLHVWUDQVDFWLRQV¶Columbia Business Law Review, 51±120. 
 
/LFKW $  µ&URVV-OLVWLQJ DQG FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH ERQGLQJ RU DYRLGLQJ"¶ Chicago 
Journal of International Law 4, 141±163. 
 
0DF1HLO ,  µ&RPSHWLWLRQ DQG FRQYHUJHQFH LQ FRUSRUDWH UHJXODWLRQ 7KH FDVH RI
RYHUVHDVOLVWHGFRPSDQLHV¶  8QSXEOLVKHGZRUNLQJSDSHU8QLYHUsity of Aberdeen. 
 
0DUULRWW&µ7KHUHGFKLSFRPSHWLWLRQKHDWVXSIRU+RQJ.RQJ¶V&KLQDSOD\V¶*OREDO
Finance, December 11±13. 
58 
 
 
0F1LFKROV0µ'LVFXVVLRQRIWKHTXDOLW\RIDFFUXDOVDQGHDUQLQJVWKHUROHRIDFFUXDO
HVWLPDWLRQHUURUV¶The Accounting Review, 77 (Supplement): 61-69. 
0LWWRQ7µ$FURVV-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East 
$VLDQILQDQFLDOFULVLV¶Journal of Financial Economics,  64, 215±241. 
 
0RUDLV$,DQG&XUWR-'µ$FFRXnting Quality and The Adoption of IASB Standards 
± 3RUWXJXHVH HYLGHQFH¶ $UWLJR DSUHVHQWDGR 1R  $QQXDO &RQJUHVV RI WKH (XURSHDQ
Accounting Association, Lisboa-Portugal 
 
1GXEL]X*$DQG6DQFKH]0+µ7KHYDOXDWLRQSURSHUWLHVRIHDUQLQJVDQG book 
YDOXHSUHSDUHGXQGHU86*$$3LQ&KLOHDQG,$6LQ3HUX¶Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 22 (2):140-170.  
 
1GXEL]X*$µ'R&URVV-Border Listing Firms Manage Earnings or Seize a Window 
RI2SSRUWXQLW\"¶The Accounting Review, 82 (4):1009 
 
1LVNDQHQ-.LQQXQHQ-DQG.DVDQHQ(µ7KH9DOXH5HOHYDQFHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO 
and Local Accounting Standards Earnings to Foreign Versus Domestic Investors: Empirical 
Evidence from Finland, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19: 119 - 137 
 
3DDQDQHQ0µ7KH,)56DGRSWLRQ¶VHIIHFWRQDFFRXQWLQJTXDOLW\LQ6ZHGHQ¶:RUNLQJ
paper, University of Hertfordshire. 
 
3DJDQR 0 5RHOO $ =HKQHU -  µ7KH JHRJUDSK\ RI HTXLW\ OLVWLQJV ZK\ GR
FRPSDQLHVOLVWDEURDG"¶Journal of Finance, 57, 2379±2856. 
 
3DFWHU3DQG<XHQ&KLQD)LQDQFLDO5HSRUWLQJ8SGDWHSSí  
 
59 
 
3RRQ : DQG )XQJ +  µ5HG FKLSV RU + VKDUHV ZKLFK &KLQD-backed securities 
SURFHVVLQIRUPDWLRQWKHIDVWHVW"¶Journal of Multinational Financial Management 10: 315 ± 
343 
 
5HHVH -U : DQG :HLVEDFK 0  µ3URWHFWLRQ RI PLQRULW\ VKDUHKROGHU LQWHUHVWV
cross-OLVWLQJV LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG VXEVHTXHQW HTXLW\ RIIHULQJV¶ Journal of Financial 
Economics, 66: 65±104.  
 
5LEVWHLQ/ µ&URVs-/LVWLQJ DQG 5HJXODWRU\ &RPSHWLWLRQ¶ Review of Law & 
Economics 1.1.  
 
5RRVHQERRP 3 DQG 'LMN 0  µ7KH PDUNHW UHDFWLRQ WR FURVV-listings: Does the 
GHVWLQDWLRQPDUNHWPDWWHU"¶Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. 
 
6(&  µSEC Takes Action to Improve Consistency of Disclosure of US Investors in 
)RUHLJQ&RPSDQLHV¶Securities and Exchange Commission.[Online] Available at: 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/207/2007-235.htm.> 
 
6(+.  µ/LVWLQJ &KLQHVH &RPSDQLHV LQ +RQJ .RQJ¶, The Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Ltd., 1996. 
 
6(+.  µ7KH 5XOHV *RYHUQLQJ WKH /LVWLQJ RI 6HFXULWLHV¶ 6WRFN ([FKDQJH RI +RQJ
Kong Ltd., 1997. 
 
6LHJHO-  µ&DQIRUHLJQILUPVERQGWKHPVHOYHVHIIHFWLYHO\E\UHQWLQJ86VHFXULWLHV
ODZV"¶Journal of Financial Economics 75, 319±359. 
 
6WXO]5µ*OREDOL]DWLRQRIHTXLW\PDUNHWVDQGWKHFRVWRIFDSLWDO¶Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 12, 8±25. 
60 
 
7DQJ<:  µ%XPS\5RDG/HDGLQJ WR Internaitonalization: A Review of Accounting 
'HYHORSPHQWLQ&KLQD¶Accounting Horizions, Vol.14 No.1 pp. 93-102 
7DQJ<:&KRZDQG&RRSHU%-µ$FFRXQWLQJDQG)LQDQFHLQ&KLQD¶7KLUGHGLWLRQ
Hong Kong: FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific. 
Niu, T.,(1997), µStock Market Integration in Hong Kong and China¶, Journal of Contemporary 
China, Volume 6, Issue 16: 487 ± 512 
Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L., (1986), Positive Accounting Theory. New York: Prentice 
Hall, 1986. 
Winkle, G. M., Huss, H. F. and Chen, X.Z. (1994), µ$FFRXQWLQJ VWDQGDUGV LQ WKH 3HRSOH
V
5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD5HVSRQGLQJWRHFRQRPLFUHIRUPV¶, Accounting Horizons 8 (3):48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Appendix: Stata Commands and Outputs: example of CL vs. HK firms 
1. Summarise statistics of variables used in the analysis  
 
                                                  
     min         .57  -.112128 -.1451234    -2.691
     max       62.55  .5495171  1.538648     14.11
     p50        4.24  .0046939  .0184214     2.846
      sd    7.732473  .0721671  .1906305  1.900441
    mean    6.779827  .0239185  .0782832  3.031898
                                                  
   stats           p     nipsp      nips      bvps
                                                                                
     min   -.6802058 -.3639541 -.5812579         0         0         0 -1.627216
     max    .8188815  .2918079  .3145052         1         1         1  1.939373
     p50    .0032647  .0022094 -.0235411         0         0         1  .2193267
      sd    .0936845  .0847174  .0765889  .1310094  .3682119   .469802  .6530257
    mean    .0021246  .0034643 -.0304842  .0173913  .1608696   .673913  .1455811
                                                                                
   stats    change~i  change~f       acc      lneg      spos       aud    return
                                                                                
     min    11.02882 -5.293599        -1 -4.300789  .0348514 -.2873741 -.7185662
     max    21.05257  3.175841  86.24744  263.5343  2.320208   .346887  4.129569
     p50    15.60676  .0883042  .1418819  .5167201  .5475261  .0520534  .1680622
      sd    2.139437  .5609313  6.119616  17.55862  .5071088  .0788268  .4565255
    mean    15.57022  .1296407  .9526632  2.338298   .646453  .0602114  .2181572
                                                                                
   stats        size    eissue    dissue       lev     aturn        cf    growth
-> clist = 1
                                                                                
                                                  
     min        .009 -53435.15 -19637.98    -17.66
     max       163.4  3011.316  5151.088    77.743
     p50       4.475  .0023702   .013057    3.1285
      sd    31.31209  3769.215  1392.218  14.20115
    mean    20.13396 -293.1873  -79.6922   9.91765
                                                  
   stats           p     nipsp      nips      bvps
                                                                                
     min   -15.50982 -.5780386 -1.211954         0         0         0 -2.420368
     max    3.231096   5.20065  3.016378         1         1         1  2.926739
     p50    .0022102  .0016249 -.0121326         0         0         1  .0291509
      sd    1.115523  .3847283  .2601379  .2043759   .306378  .3375157  .7690579
    mean   -.0466288  .0407976 -.0111962  .0434783  .1043478  .8695652   .003879
                                                                                
   stats    change~i  change~f       acc      lneg      spos       aud    return
                                                                                
     min    9.670735 -117.0293        -1 -1.594556         0 -1.776575        -1
     max    21.22416  19.41839  752.0541  19.13587  6.148336  .4996267  54.25872
     p50    15.12871  .1008739  .0668757  .4020887  .5188026  .0435497  .0982148
      sd    2.312847  7.891805  63.29841    1.5859  .8401052  .1755416  3.624589
    mean    15.27991 -.2374542  6.366042  .6589147  .7182429  .0433682  .3842984
                                                                                
   stats        size    eissue    dissue       lev     aturn        cf    growth
-> clist = 0
                                                                                
> ax min ) columns(variables)
> ge_cf acc lneg spos aud return p nipsp nips bvps, statistics( mean sd median m
. by clist, sort : tabstat size eissue dissue lev aturn cf growth change_ni chan
. do "C:\Users\lenovo\AppData\Local\Temp\STD00000000.tmp"
file I:\CL vs. HK dataset.dta saved
. save "I:\CL vs. HK dataset.dta", replace
. *(21 variables, 460 observations pasted into data editor)
. edit
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2. Emprical results of accounting quality analysis ( CL firms vs. HK firms) 
For all the variables, I winsorized them at 1% level before running the regression. For example, the 
Stata command to winsorize variable size, 
³winsor size, gen(size_w) p(0.01)´ 
x Earning smoothing metric one οNIit = Į0 + Į1 SIZEit + Į2GROWTHit + Į3EISSUEit + Į4LEVit + Į5DISSUEit + Į6TURNit +
Į7CFit + Į8AUDit + ɂit                                                (1)                        
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0565598   .0501709     1.13   0.261    -.0423407    .1554602
       aud_w     .0128884   .0149898     0.86   0.391    -.0166605    .0424373
    growth_w     .0084103     .01581     0.53   0.595    -.0227555    .0395762
        cf_w     .3724103   .0795055     4.68   0.000     .2156834    .5291371
     aturn_w    -.0041236   .0123513    -0.33   0.739    -.0284714    .0202242
       lev_w     .0045662   .0027293     1.67   0.096     -.000814    .0099463
    dissue_w    -.0002214   .0026841    -0.08   0.934    -.0055124    .0050696
    eissue_w     .0587914   .0153767     3.82   0.000     .0284798     .089103
      size_w    -.0063515   .0034847    -1.82   0.070    -.0132207    .0005177
                                                                              
 change_ni_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.87055824   219  .008541362           Root MSE      =  .08499
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1543
    Residual    1.52413982   211  .007223411           R-squared     =  0.1852
       Model    .346418425     8  .043302303           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   211) =    5.99
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     220
> clist==1
. reg change_ni_w size_w eissue_w dissue_w lev_w aturn_w cf_w growth_w aud_w if 
                delta:  1 unit
        time variable:  year, 2005 to 2009
       panel variable:  firm (strongly balanced)
. xtset firm year
                                                                              
       _cons     .0760799   .1301083     0.58   0.559    -.1805453    .3327051
       aud_w      .020353    .052154     0.39   0.697    -.0825153    .1232212
    growth_w     .0854737   .0246436     3.47   0.001     .0368667    .1340807
        cf_w    -.0386166   .1735416    -0.22   0.824    -.3809094    .3036762
     aturn_w    -.0217761    .026534    -0.82   0.413    -.0741117    .0305595
       lev_w    -.0089438   .0118281    -0.76   0.450    -.0322735    .0143859
    dissue_w    -.0224316   .0074885    -3.00   0.003    -.0372019   -.0076612
    eissue_w    -.0129935   .0260632    -0.50   0.619    -.0644004    .0384134
      size_w     -.004332   .0082335    -0.53   0.599    -.0205717    .0119077
                                                                              
 change_ni_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    8.98814598   200   .04494073           Root MSE      =  .20472
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0675
    Residual    8.04658606   192  .041909302           R-squared     =  0.1048
       Model    .941559919     8   .11769499           Prob > F      =  0.0058
                                                       F(  8,   192) =    2.81
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     201
> clist==0
. reg change_ni_w size_w eissue_w dissue_w lev_w aturn_w cf_w growth_w aud_w if 
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x Earning smoothing metric two οCFit = Ƚ0 + Ƚ1 SIZEit + Ƚ2GROWTHit + Ƚ3EISSUEit + Ƚ4LEVit + Ƚ5DISSUEit + Ƚ6TURNit +Ƚ7CFit + Ƚ8AUDit + ɂit                       (2)                                     
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0831531   .0369126     2.25   0.025     .0103884    .1559179
       aud_w     .0209314   .0110285     1.90   0.059    -.0008088    .0426716
    growth_w    -.0046473    .011632    -0.40   0.690    -.0275772    .0182825
        cf_w     .7758475   .0584952    13.26   0.000     .6605377    .8911572
     aturn_w    -.0165216   .0090873    -1.82   0.070    -.0344351     .001392
       lev_w     .0026012    .002008     1.30   0.197    -.0013572    .0065596
    dissue_w    -.0005861   .0019748    -0.30   0.767    -.0044789    .0033066
    eissue_w     .0131719   .0113132     1.16   0.246    -.0091295    .0354732
      size_w    -.0086388   .0025638    -3.37   0.001    -.0136928   -.0035849
                                                                              
 change_cf_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.57184118   219  .007177357           Root MSE      =  .06253
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4552
    Residual    .825031061   211    .0039101           R-squared     =  0.4751
       Model    .746810117     8  .093351265           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   211) =   23.87
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     220
> clist==1
. reg change_cf_w size_w eissue_w dissue_w lev_w aturn_w cf_w growth_w aud_w if 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1789591   .0583234     3.07   0.002     .0639184    .2939998
       aud_w    -.0244931    .023408    -1.05   0.297    -.0706645    .0216783
    growth_w      .000583   .0110496     0.05   0.958     -.021212     .022378
        cf_w     .6122311   .0780959     7.84   0.000     .4581899    .7662723
     aturn_w    -.0202829   .0118603    -1.71   0.089    -.0436769    .0031111
       lev_w     .0077552   .0052939     1.46   0.145    -.0026868    .0181973
    dissue_w    -.0036673   .0033463    -1.10   0.274    -.0102678    .0029331
    eissue_w     .0024118   .0116475     0.21   0.836    -.0205625     .025386
      size_w    -.0108425   .0036938    -2.94   0.004    -.0181283   -.0035566
                                                                              
 change_cf_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.21030203   199  .011107045           Root MSE      =  .09148
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2466
    Residual    1.59837926   191  .008368478           R-squared     =  0.2769
       Model    .611922765     8  .076490346           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   191) =    9.14
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     200
> clist==0
. reg change_cf_w size_w eissue_w dissue_w lev_w aturn_w cf_w growth_w aud_w if 
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x Earning smoothing metric three 
CFit = Į0 + Į1 SIZEit + Į2GROWTHit + Į3EISSUEit + Į4LEVit + Į5DISSUEit + Į6TURNit +
Į7AUDit + İit                                                                  (3)                    
ACCit = Ƚ0 + Ƚ1 SIZEit + Ƚ2GROWTHit + Ƚ3EISSUEit + Ƚ4LEVit + Ƚ5DISSUEit + Ƚ6TURNit +Ƚ7AUDit + ɂit                                                                (4) 
 
 
x Managing towards small positive earnings metric 
CLISTሺ0,1ሻ = Į0 + Į1SPOS + Į2 SIZEit + Į3GROWTHit + Į4EISSUEit + Į5LEVit + Į6DISSUEit +
Į7TURNit + Į8CFit + Į9AUDit + ɂit                                                (5) 
 
 
 
 
    Prob > |t| =       0.0000
Test of Ho: e_cf1 and e_acc1 are independent
Spearman's rho =      -0.6068
 Number of obs =     220
. spearman e_cf1 e_acc1
    Prob > |t| =       0.0000
Test of Ho: e_cf0 and e_acc0 are independent
Spearman's rho =      -0.5079
 Number of obs =     201
. spearman e_cf0 e_acc0
                                                                              
       _cons     .0872768   .1968785     0.44   0.658    -.2997375    .4742912
       aud_w    -.4138237   .0612223    -6.76   0.000    -.5341715   -.2934759
    growth_w     .0368607     .04678     0.79   0.431    -.0550972    .1288186
        cf_w     .4866066   .2855736     1.70   0.089    -.0747605    1.047974
     aturn_w     .0346787   .0439821     0.79   0.431    -.0517793    .1211366
       lev_w     .0359878   .0127748     2.82   0.005     .0108758    .0610999
    dissue_w    -.0046176   .0109339    -0.42   0.673    -.0261109    .0168757
    eissue_w    -.0480533   .0482414    -1.00   0.320    -.1428841    .0467774
      size_w     .0428082    .013121     3.26   0.001     .0170156    .0686008
      spos_w     .0627951   .0734133     0.86   0.393    -.0815173    .2071075
                                                                              
       clist        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    105.035629   420  .250084832           Root MSE      =  .47302
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1053
    Residual    91.9623194   411  .223752602           R-squared     =  0.1245
       Model      13.07331     9     1.45259           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9,   411) =    6.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     421
. reg clist spos_w size_w eissue_w dissue_w lev_w aturn_w cf_w growth_w aud_w
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x Timely loss recognition 
CLISTሺ0,1ሻ = Ƚ0 + Ƚ1LNEG + Ƚ2 SIZEit +  Ƚ3GROWTHit + Ƚ4EISSUEit + Ƚ5LEVit + Ƚ6DISSUEit +Ƚ7TURNit + Ƚ8CFit + Ƚ9AUDit + ɂit                                       (6) 
 
x Value relevance metric one 
Pit = Į0 + Į1BVPSit + Į2 NIPSit + İit                                             (7)             
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0749724   .1964878     0.38   0.703    -.3112739    .4612188
       aud_w    -.4142699   .0613139    -6.76   0.000    -.5347979   -.2937418
    growth_w     .0300159   .0460683     0.65   0.515    -.0605429    .1205748
        cf_w      .416272   .2955501     1.41   0.160    -.1647064    .9972503
     aturn_w     .0332901   .0440366     0.76   0.450     -.053275    .1198551
       lev_w     .0369322   .0127957     2.89   0.004      .011779    .0620854
    dissue_w    -.0040201   .0109519    -0.37   0.714    -.0255489    .0175088
    eissue_w    -.0495293   .0494218    -1.00   0.317    -.1466803    .0476217
      size_w      .044577   .0129557     3.44   0.001     .0191092    .0700448
      lneg_w    -.0595915   .1658389    -0.36   0.720    -.3855897    .2664067
                                                                              
       clist        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    105.035629   420  .250084832           Root MSE      =  .47337
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1040
    Residual    92.0970939   411   .22408052           R-squared     =  0.1232
       Model    12.9385356     9  1.43761506           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9,   411) =    6.42
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     421
. reg clist lneg_w size_w eissue_w dissue_w lev_w aturn_w cf_w growth_w aud_w
                                                                              
       _cons     1.312717   1.418188     0.93   0.356    -1.482187     4.10762
      bvps_w     1.891135   .0846521    22.34   0.000     1.724306    2.057963
      nips_w     .0074659   .0458969     0.16   0.871    -.0829857    .0979175
                                                                              
         p_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205559.699   223  921.792372           Root MSE      =  16.864
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6915
    Residual    62851.0208   221  284.393759           R-squared     =  0.6942
       Model    142708.678     2  71354.3391           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   221) =  250.90
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     224
. reg  p_w nips_w bvps_w if clist==0 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.717572   .7130038    -2.41   0.017    -3.122693   -.3124496
      bvps_w      2.85685   .1935357    14.76   0.000     2.475447    3.238252
      nips_w    -2.098503   1.929405    -1.09   0.278    -5.900795     1.70379
                                                                              
         p_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    13393.2142   224  59.7911347           Root MSE      =  5.5008
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4939
    Residual    6717.35859   222   30.258372           R-squared     =  0.4985
       Model    6675.85557     2  3337.92779           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   222) =  110.31
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     225
. reg  p_w nips_w bvps_w if clist==1
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x Value relevance metric two 
[NIPS/P]it = Ƚ0 + Ƚ1RETURNit + ɂit                                                (8)                
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     4.137783   12.73662     0.32   0.746    -21.14421    29.41978
       bnews    -8.818781   16.13912    -0.55   0.586    -40.85468    23.21712
                                                                              
     nipsp_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     653030.68    97  6732.27505           Root MSE      =  82.349
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0073
    Residual    651005.931    96  6781.31178           R-squared     =  0.0031
       Model    2024.74863     1  2024.74863           Prob > F      =  0.5860
                                                       F(  1,    96) =    0.30
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      98
. reg nipsp_w bnews if clist==0
                                                                              
       _cons     .0186974   .0079792     2.34   0.022     .0027751    .0346197
       bnews     .0106059   .0107345     0.99   0.327    -.0108144    .0320262
                                                                              
     nipsp_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .101380844    69  .001469288           Root MSE      =  .03834
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0003
    Residual    .099946045    68  .001469795           R-squared     =  0.0142
       Model    .001434799     1  .001434799           Prob > F      =  0.3266
                                                       F(  1,    68) =    0.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      70
. reg nipsp_w bnews if clist==1
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.992765   11.39282     0.35   0.727    -18.56234    26.54787
       gnews     19.51862   17.17072     1.14   0.258    -14.47535     53.5126
                                                                              
     nipsp_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    970106.648   122  7951.69384           Root MSE      =  89.066
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0024
    Residual    959856.221   121  7932.69604           R-squared     =  0.0106
       Model    10250.4266     1  10250.4266           Prob > F      =  0.2579
                                                       F(  1,   121) =    1.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     123
. reg nipsp_w gnews if clist==0
                                                                              
       _cons      .039474   .0117724     3.35   0.001     .0162036    .0627444
       gnews       -.0194   .0186337    -1.04   0.300     -.056233    .0174331
                                                                              
     nipsp_w        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .999002208   144  .006937515           Root MSE      =  .08327
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0006
    Residual    .991486748   143  .006933474           R-squared     =  0.0075
       Model     .00751546     1   .00751546           Prob > F      =  0.2996
                                                       F(  1,   143) =    1.08
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     145
. reg nipsp_w gnews if clist==1
. 
(290 missing values generated)
. gen bnews=return_w if return_w<0
. 
(189 missing values generated)
. gen gnews=return_w if return_w>=0
